Military Service as a Process of Political Socialization

The Case of Universal Conscription in Israel

HAMANAKA Shingo

政治的社会化過程としての兵役

イスラエルにおける国民皆兵の事例

浜中　新吾

　軍隊は社会的価値の生成と内面化にとって重大な役割を果たす組織である。イスラエルは国民皆兵を採用しており、若者の国民統合に大きな役割を果たしている。しかしながら国民皆兵の建前にも関わらず、市民の三人に一人は兵役を免れているという。本稿は兵役免除という事実を利用して、兵役の政治的社会化機能を分析した。すなわ

ちイスラエル国防軍への従軍が市民の政治的態度に与える影響を実証的に検討している。ここでは軍務の国民統合機能に関する理論から導出した仮説を検証した。その仮説とは、軍隊への従軍経験が国防意識を高め、パレスチナ占領地域を護持しようとする非妥協的な態度を生み出す、というものである。

仮説検証に用いたデータはユダヤ人市民を対象に2007年2月に実施された民主主義サーベイである。リサーチ・デザインでは疑似ランダム的に従軍経験を持つ処置群と従軍経験を持たない統制群を同数になるよう生成するため、プロペンシティ・スコア・マッチングを行った。これにより兵役を免除される属性（性別、宗教的アイデンティティ、旧ソ連邦からの移民）を統制し、属性の面で差異のない二群を創り出すことで比較分析を可能にした。

本稿の分析では、徴兵されたユダヤ人市民と徴兵されなかったユダヤ人市民の間で、民主主義への満足度、シオニスト・アイデンティティ、リーダーシップやナショナル・プライドについての意見に差異は見られなかった。しかしながら、軍隊経験を持つ市民はアラブ人の強制追放政策に反対し、紛争解決のために西岸地区の領土的譲歩を支持する、という反直感的な結果を得た。この結果は軍務の国民統合機能に関する理論に再検討を迫ると同時に、パレスチナ問題の二国家解決案に望みを繋ぐものでもある。なぜならイスラエル市民の多数派である従軍経験者は少数派である非経験者に比べて中東和平問題の解決に向けてより穏健であり、過剰な政策に反対する姿勢を示していると言えるからである。

I. Introduction

It is common knowledge that the armed forces were a crucial institution in the creation and internalization of social values. From ancient Greece to recently independent nations, state leaders have employed universal conscription to integrate a diverse populace into a strong and coherent nation, especially in wartime. The governments in the Middle East, a region characterized by war-proneness, used the military to involve the people in nation building, the process of constructing a national identity. Zartman [1993: 253] depicts national service as bringing a large segment of the population together and taking a key role in the modernization of traditional society. Therefore, the military acts as an institution to socialize lower ranking soldiers and officers to national norms. While a nation usually contains cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity, this often produces severe conflicts of political opinions and

interests, even affecting national security. Multi-ethnicity and immigrants can create a vigorous and dynamic society but may cause interethnic and political tension. Universal conscription is not a solution to this type of social conflict.

It is unclear whether military service can achieve national consensus on important issues with respect to national interest. Nation-states can utilize the armed forces to indoctrinate citizens as uncritical soldiers of orders from their superiors. Because state leaders need majority support from the populace to wage war on adversaries, it is expedient for politicians that public opinion be unified behind national defense. However, military education programs, combat training, and experience in actual warfare are not always enough to make compliant patriots of citizens. A number of socioeconomic characteristics, such as political ideology, religiosity, ethnicity, class, and gender, are evoked to explain the differences of attitudes toward national politics. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of military service on a multiplicity of opinions about political issues by removing the influence of other factors.

To test the appropriateness of my argument, I address a country that faces constant external threat, applies universal conscription, and begins military operations frequently. Accordingly, this study considers the state of Israel from the above perspective. Israeli governments have faced constant national security concerns, conscripted citizens into the army, and defended itself repeatedly. In the following section, we provide a brief overview of military service in Israel and propose a hypothesis for the link between public opinion on political issues and military experience. The second section presents an outline of survey research in Israel, measuring attitudes toward security policies, both for those drafted and those not drafted. The third section explains the research strategy for empirical analysis and presents the results in consideration of the hypothesis. Although our empirical approach is rarely applied in social science literature, we show that our method is superior to the traditional approaches to control confounding factors. The final section discusses the results and indicates some theoretical implications.

II. Military Service and Political Attitudes: A Brief Literature Review

The citizens go into the Israel Defense Force (IDF) through the universal draft system, which applies to most Jewish citizens. It is well known that the state of Israel

employs a universal conscription system that includes compulsory service for women. According to Mahler [2011: 227], draft-age females spend two years in active duty without participating in combat, but only about 60 percent of all women join the reserves, and they are only required to until the age of twenty-five. In contrast, about 90 percent of men are drafted and serve three years in barracks on active duty. Israeli men do about one month of annual reserve duty until the age of fifty-one. A major study of the Israeli civil-military relationship describes the IDF as a primary agent of socialization and assimilation for generations of immigrants. "Military service has become one of hallmarks of citizenship in most modern states and a symbol of the individual's identification with the center of political authority. In Israel it has assumed an added importance, expressing not only political affiliation, but also membership of the collective, whose basis is more exclusive because it reflects the social basis itself" [Peri 1983: 22].

The IDF fulfills the institutional function of socializing the people, such as in families, schools and workplaces. The first half of regular service has a profound impact in terms of the political socialization of fresh recruits because the training turns civilian youths into fighters. According to Arian [2005: 436], the definition of political socialization in this article means "the process by which values important to the political system are internalized." Arian [2005: 437] counts the army as one of the agents to lead to the internalization of hierarchical and bureaucratic values on Israeli youth. The military experience is believed to strengthen national identity and enhance patriotism among recruits. The militarized socialization process begins even before children enter an elementary school. Furman [1999] describes the process of the construction of militaristic attitudes and behavior among students listening to a heroic narrative about masculine soldiers. The IDF recruiters attempt to contact the final-year male students in high school to persuade them to enlist in combat units [Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008: 355]. Military service is not only a place for discipline but also a socializing agent for recruits. "Of all the periods of IDF duty, the most critical in terms of socialization is the first half of regular service" [Popper 1998: 170]. The young soldiers have an opportunity to consolidate their identity as "a good citizen" with military experience in a people's army. Israel society recognizes military service as a rite of passage to adulthood and as an important requisite for the job search and applications for university admissions. Military service is also the social system that segregates Jews from the Arab population to maintain the Jewishness of the state.

The Israeli draft system is regarded as an institution to integrate people of

different and multiethnic backgrounds into one nation. Some sociologists, however, present an alternative view of the function of militarized socialization in the army. Shafir and Peled [2002] reveal that the integration process in the army cannot redress the social divide in the citizenry but rather reproduces social class hierarchies caused by socioeconomic characteristics; Ashkenazim, Mizrahim, and Palestinians. Israeli society upholds the republican ethos of dedication to military service as a supreme social value. The citizen-soldier principle permitted Ashkenazi commanders to seize elite status because of accessibility to valuable social positions; the Ashkenazi hegemony, in other words [Levy 2011: 43]. The US state department [2009] criticizes the Israeli military service as a discriminatory system of social stratification:

> Military service is compulsory only for Jews, Druze, and the 5,000 member Circassian community (Muslims from the northwestern Caucasus region who immigrated to various points in the Ottoman-controlled Middle East in the late nineteenth century). Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Israeli Arabs—both Muslim and Christian—are exempt. The majority of Israeli Arabs opt not to serve in the army; however, some Christian and Muslim Arab citizens, mainly Bedouin, serve as volunteers. As of June 2007, Israeli Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews can perform national service for one to two years as volunteers in health, education, or welfare sectors in lieu of military service. This service confers eligibility for similar national benefits accorded military veterans. Israeli-Arab advocacy groups, Knesset members, and local community leaders have charged that housing, educational, and other benefits, as well as employment preferences based on military experience effectively discriminate in favor of the Jewish population, the majority of which serves in the military.

The centrality of the military marginalizes Arab Israelis[1] and ultra-orthodox Jews because of exemption from service and disqualifies lower educated Mizrahim from the draft [Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008: 354]. As this alternative view of military socialization indicates, if the IDF reproduces the social divide, it will be observable in the draft. For this reason, I formulate a hypothesis that tests the effects of military service:

Hypothesis 1: The draft is more sensitive to the social divide than the non-draft in Israel.

There is literature that addresses conscription's effect on Israeli feelings about national politics, such as national identity and security policy. Asher Arian, the most comprehensive analyst of survey datasets about Israeli attitudes toward national security, examines conscription's effect on security attitudes. The poll was conducted in January 1986. The survey concludes that the more military experience a citizen has, the more likely he will consider Israel capable of dealing with security threats. The data presents another finding about the political issues of dealing with the occupied territories; there is a tendency toward the most intransigent attitude regarding returning territories in citizens with the least military experience [Arian, Talmud, and Hermann 1988: 61-64]. Later, the trend of the time series polls also shows, with great significance, that soldiers who served in the territories felt the measures used during the First Intifada were too soft [Arian 1995: 68]. Previous studies provide no consistent findings about the effect of conscription on national security policy. The inconsistency may be attributable to the application of simple or rudimentary statistical methods, which disregard other control variables that might eliminate spurious relationships. That is, a true regressor for political attitudes toward national security might not be army experience but possibly ethnicity or another demographic factor. There is likely to be a possible structural break with past attitudes caused by an external event, such as the First Intifada.

In Israel, it was recently reported that about 60 percent of the Jewish people still supported for continuing the peace process [Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky 2013: 75-76]. Despite of it, no Israel government since the Second Intifada had made progress toward peace with the Palestinian Authority. In every election, the electorate has supported the right-wing bloc: the Likud party or Kadima, which was composed of politicians who defected from the Likud. The election outcomes show that most citizens believe peace with the Palestinians is impossible because of the wave of terror attacks, kidnappings, and multiple wars in the first decade of this century. The War on Terror, the phrase used by US President George W. Bush, escalated the cycle of violence in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but it is not clear whether the Israelis expect reliable peace talks because of the series of Palestinian attacks. As such, I consider again the effect of the experience of conscription on opinions about solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, especially for the territorial issue today.

Hypothesis 2: Military experience produces a specific trend in Israeli opinion on the territorial issue.

Let us now look at cases in another country. The majority of empirical research on the effect of the draft on human behavior has been conducted in the United States. Recent studies focus on the case of the Vietnam War because of the imposed draft lottery, which functioned as a random selection. Such randomness is convenient for social scientists to find true causation, so it is called a quasi-experiment or a natural experiment. According to Bergan [2009], using the panel survey at the University of Virginia, students with a low number in the draft lottery, therefore more likely to be drafted, were likely to support early withdrawal from the Vietnam War. This finding suggests that self-interest drives people's attitude toward war, in spite of previous results suggesting no effect. Horowitz and Levendusky [2011] demonstrate that conscription decreases mass support for war, especially among young, draft-age men and their parents, in exploiting an original survey experiment. Erikson and Stoker [2011] examine the extent to which the draft lottery influences vote choice, presidential candidate evaluations, policy issue attitudes, ideology, and partisanship. They regard the lottery as a natural experiment with essentially random selection to get rid of the confounding factors in the Jennings-Niemi panel data of 1965 high school teenagers. All the literature supports the self-interest effect on attitudes toward war. These findings could generally be identified as the self-interest effect of military service.

Hypothesis 3: Draftees want to avert a risk on the basis of the self-interest mechanism.

III. Data and Method

Data Set. The data for this study come from the Democracy Index Project of the Guttman Center for Surveys in the Israel Democracy Institute. The original survey consisted of interviews with a national sample of 1,203 Israeli adults, Jews and Arabs, 18 years and older, in the state of Israel. The survey was conducted by telephone in Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic in February 2007. The sampling error at a 95 percent level of confidence was +/−2.8 [Arian, Atmor, and Hadar 2007]. This study depends on only the Jewish sample of the data because universal conscription does not apply to Arabs holding Israeli citizenship. Therefore, our analysis works with a sample of 969 Jewish Israeli citizens to measure the effect of military service on political attitudes.

Universal Conscription? In spite of the popular belief that most Israeli citizens are

conscripted, a substantial percentage of potential conscripts do not serve in the military. Haaretz, a respected news source in Israel, reported that over one quarter of Israeli males are not recruited into the IDF.[2] The data present a question about conscription and tell us that only 71 percent of Jewish citizens served regular or reserve military service. This result supports the article in Haaretz and shows a different image from that of the universal conscription system. This study uses the variable of military service to produce an as-if randomized treatment and control group, almost identical except for experiences in the military, in order to control confounding factors in the sample.

Dependent Variables. The survey includes a series of political attitudes toward three indices, 1) Social Inequalities, 2) Strictly Defense Policy, and 3) Self-Interest, which are used as dependent variables in this study. To measure attitudes toward Social Inequalities, we compose a binary response by using the items of opinion about Social Tension[3] on a scale of 1 to 5 (1-there is much less and 5-there is much more) and Relationship among Groups[4] on a 4-point measure (1-not good at all and 4-very good). The other two indices, Strictly Defense Policy and Self-Interest, are operationalized as follow; we create responses from the items of Arab Emigration and Noncompromise Territories[5] and later responses from the variables about two items of Enlisting[6] and Military Budget.[7] Table 1 shows descriptive statistics about political attitudes toward three indices and we can recognize that only four items indicate over 0.1 absolute values of the simple differences.

Method. My research is an observational study in using the survey data. This type of study is not free from several biases that are avoidable with a randomized controlled trial. We must suggest a research design to address the negative influence of the bias on finding true causal inferences. The estimation of the impact of military service has a constraint because of confounding factors among Jewish citizens. There are many differences between citizens with conscripted experience and without it in education, occupation, size of family, and monthly expenditure. The impact of service on security policies may be affected by the interaction of demographic factors and control variables, so researchers must consider numerous combination patterns of the interactions in the regression models for effective estimates. In other words, attention must be given to addressing the curse of dimensionality.

One solution to control confounders is propensity score matching, proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983]. This method has the advantage of reducing bias in estimations of religious impact as if it were a natural science. Propensity score

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics

	(a) Conscripts	(b) Not Conscripts	Difference		
	Mean	Mean	(a) - (b)	SD	All Obs
Social Inequalities					
Social Tension	0.424	0.395	0.291	0.039	785
Relationship: Religious-Secular	0.648	0.644	0.004	0.037	828
Relationship: Ashkenazim-Mizrahim	0.532	0.551	− 0.018	0.039	820
Relationship: Immigrant-Old timers	0.629	0.595	0.033	0.038	816
Relationship: Rich-Poor	0.807	0.795	0.012	0.031	803
Strictly Defense Policy					
Arab Emigration	0.473	0.723	− 0.249	0.038	804
Noncompromise Territories	0.447	0.671	− 0.223	0.038	835
Self-Interest					
Service	0.597	0.726	− 0.129	0.038	796
Parental Advice Regarding Service	0.392	0.334	0.057	0.039	792
Military Bugdet	0.180	0.182	− 0.001	0.030	822

(Source)
(Note)

means a predictive probability to a treatment group estimated from the existence of confounding factors.[8] Using the propensity score, we must data match to get the estimates of conscription as the treatment group on the attitudes to foreign policies described as average treatment effects (ATE). The employed matching algorithm is the Kernel matching method, proposed by Heckman et al. [1998]. The analysis was conducted using an add-on program, psmatch2, for STATA, developed by Leuven and Sianesi [2003]. Rosenbaum and Rubin also caution researchers to pay attention to a hidden bias: The presence of unobserved heterogeneity might affect the robustness of matching estimators. This problem is associated with observation studies and is difficult to deal with, but there is a method to estimate the size of a hidden bias in a result, called Sensitivity analysis. When the result of ATE estimation is statistically significant, I further conduct sensitivity analysis in using an add-on, rbounds, provided by DiPrete and Gangl [2004].

Table 2 presents statistics of covariates to estimate the propensity score of the conscriptions. The criterion for covariate selection comes from regression models and qualitative studies in the literature. Arian, Talmud, and Hermann [1988], Horowitz and Levendusky [2011], Izraeli [2004], and Levy and Sasson-Levy [2008] controlled

TABLE 2. Estimation of the Propensity Score of Secular

Covariate	Coefficient	Wald	p
Ideology	0.044	1.35	0.177
Age	0.007	2.16	0.030
Former Soviet Union	− 0.617	− 3.57	0.000
Male	0.601	5.73	0.000
Religiosity	− 0.478	− 7.76	0.000
Expenditure	0.096	2.58	0.010
Social Class	0.089	1.15	0.250
City	0.167	1.36	0.175
Sabra	0.361	2.39	0.017
Constant	0.142	0.40	0.689

N = 835, Log likelihood = − 394.44, Psedo R2=0.189

(Source)
(Note)

partisanship and demographics (Sex, Age, Income, Ethnicity, and Social Class) in the models for their estimations of conscription effect. Table 2 shows that many covariates are significant for the estimated score of the treatment group without considering ideology, social class, and city. The algorithm of psmatch2 follows almost the same procedure of the probit model to estimate propensity scores on the covariates. It is based on the maximum likelihood approach to the probability of who is drafted into the army. According to the results in Table 2, religious Jews, females, and immigrants from the countries in the former Soviet Union have a tendency not to go into the IDF.

IV. Analysis

Table 3 indicates the estimation of the differences in the means between conscripts and non-conscripts with the controlling influence of the cofounders. All estimation scores are lower than simple and rough differences in Table 1. It means several cofounders amplify the effect of conscription on the dependent variables, and thus we need a research design to avoid bias induced by an inadequate method. The conscripted experience is not significant and cannot explain the differences in the Social Inequalities and Self-Interest index. The estimation of the difference in Social Tension, for example, is just 0.031 points and insignificant in Table 3, so the simple difference,

TABLE 3. Impact of Military Service on Political Attitudes

Dependent Variables	Estimation of Difference by ATE		t-statistics	Bias %	Sensitivity Analysis Γ
Social Inequalities					
Social Tension	0.031	(0.057)	0.56	6.5	
Relationship: Religious-Secular	− 0.062	(0.037)	− 1.11	− 13.0	
Relationship: Ashkenazim-Mizrahim	− 0.008	(0.056)	− 0.16	− 1.8	
Relationship: Immigrant-Old timers	− 0.025	(0.055)	− 0.46	− 5.2	
Relationship: Rich-Poor	− 0.020	(0.046)	− 0.44	− 5.1	
Strictly Defense Policy					
Arab Emigration	− 0.163	(0.052)	− 3.13	− 34.5	2.54
Noncompromise Territories	− 0.147	(0.054)	− 2.73	− 30.5	2.60
Self-Interest					
Service	− 0.078	(0.052)	− 1.48	− 16.6	
Parental Advice Regarding Service	− 0.008	(0.055)	− 0.15	− 1.7	
Military Bugdet	0.012	(0.044)	0.28	3.2	

(Source)
(Note)

0.291-point positive assessment, in Social Tension is the only dissimulation in Table 1. Despite the salience of several social inequalities in Israel and many indications given by political sociologists,[9] military experience does not lead to recognition of them.

Only one item dealing with Strictly Defense Policy is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, so we can know both t-statistics values are greater than the 1.96 levels. As can be seen in Table 3, the conscripted evaluation of Arab Emigration is calculated 0.163 points lower than the non-conscripted group's evaluation. Conscripted Jews assess Territorial Noncompromise at an average 0.147 points lower than citizens without military experience. Although the results contain biases of more than 30 percent, they pass Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis of average treatment effects on conscription, a test to check the result in the presence of an omitted variable bias. We cannot deny a probability that our results in the propensity score analysis for Strictly Defense Policy contain a certain amount of bias, but they still make sense. Generally, it is evident in Table 3 that military experience leads citizens to a preference for lenient policy.

The findings of the mandatory service effect only support the second hypothesis, that military experience leads citizens to believe that Israel can deal with security threats; Figure 1 illustrates that the drafted oppose the Palestinian transfer policy at

some level, and Figure 2 shows that they comparatively prefer territorial compromise for the resolution. The patterns shown in both figures are binomial responses to policies split over estimated grouping, treated and untreated group, by psmatch2. At the same time, our findings do not support the sensitivity hypothesis to social inequalities or the first hypothesis, and the self-interest mechanism underlying the third hypothesis. There is no statistically significant difference in feelings about inequalities or risk-taking in combat units between veterans and non-veterans. It is likely that the Israeli people regard the draft system as the institution to integrate individuals of different and multiethnic backgrounds, and members of society accept the conventional wisdom of respecting the dedication of a combatant in the IDF [Cohen 2008].

V. Conclusion

The Middle East Peace Process, the direct talks between Israel and Palestine, faces continual crisis after the turn of the millennium, the outbreak of the Second Intifada. For many Israelis and Palestinians today, there is no hope in sight for the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority took unilateral approaches without peace negotiations. Successive Israeli prime ministers have developed and enlarged the area of the West Bank settlements. The Palestinian Authority could not end armed resistance to Israel and made a direct diplomatic approach to the United Nations for the improvement of conditions. Although the Middle East Peace Process progressed on the foundation of the two-state solution, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the future, recent efforts for a renewal of the dialogue between Israel and Fatah have faced political stagnation, and the process is on the verge of death. Most people, including politicians, diplomats, commentators, journalists, and researchers on the Palestine question believe the situation has fallen into diplomatic paralysis and that the two-state solution has almost failed.

This study examines the effect of military service on a multiplicity of opinions about political issues in the case of a state that faces constant external threat, applies universal conscription, and has defended itself against enemies frequently, the state of Israel. It finds that the mandatory service effect only supports the second hypothesis; military experience produces a specific trend in opinion about the territorial issue. Conscripted citizens comparatively prefer territorial compromise for the resolution

Figure 1: Attitudes toward Arab Emigration Policy (%)

(Source)
(Note)

Figure 2: Attitudes toward Territorial Compromise for the resolution (%)

(Source)
(Note)

and have a tendency to, at some level, oppose the policy of deporting Palestinians. The findings bring us hope that the two-state solution is still a viable option. The two-state solution must return enough territories to establish an independent state for the Palestinians; they should not be transferred from the occupied territories either from a humanitarian perspective or with respect to international legal standards, despite the risk to the principles of Zionism: a Jewish majority in a Jewish state. It is interesting that Arian, Talmud, and Hermann [1988] propose a mechanism in which military experience leads citizens to believe Israel has the power to deal with security threats. The findings suggest that the mechanism drives conscripted citizens into a somewhat moderate and centrist position in comparison with the non-conscripted, who adopt a more ethnocentric stance on territorial issues in the post-Cold War era.

There are some limitations to the study. To test the hypotheses, we can analyze only the 2007 Israel Democracy Index survey because variables of conscription appear in only this data among the open sources. We, therefore, need be careful of making generalizations about our findings because of the observations suffered from several political events at that time. Notwithstanding the limitations of using the single cross-section data, this study suggests that the universal draft system as a process of political socialization integrates different generations of immigrants and ethnicities into the citizenry of the state with national and moral values. If military experience makes a citizen moderate and more "moralistic" about the dispute, this inference is paradoxical and unintuitive on the issue of war and peace.

Notes

(1)   The Druze is an exception to the exclusion of non-Jews from service. The IDF decided Israel's male Druze citizens could be subjected to mandatory conscription in 1956. The decision produced

the policy of integrating minority Druze as ordinary Israeli citizens and discriminating them from Christian and Muslim Arabs as second-class citizens. See Krebs [2006: 44-93].

(2)   Grinberg, Mijal [2007] "IDF: Nearly 28% of Israeli males avoided conscription in 2007," Haaretz, November 6, 2007.

(3)   The question is the follow wording: In your opinion, is there more or less tensions between groups in society? (Q41_3). I rescaled to range from 0 (=much less, less, and moderately) to 1 (=more and much more).

(4)   This item asked about the relationship between religious and non-religious (Q38_1), Ashkenazim and Mizrahim (Q38_2), new immigrant and old timers (Q38_4), and rich and poor (Q38_5). Lower choices (=1 and 2) were recoded positive in the binary response.

(5)   "Concerning the territories Israel has occupied since the Six-Days War, what in your opinion is the biggest concession that should be made so as to reach peace?" (Q15) The respondents could reply to the question from among five choices: from "Give up all these territories so as to reach a peace agreement" to "Not give up any territories at all."

(6)   "If you were about to go to the army now, what would you do?" (Q16) "If you were a parent of a son about to go to the army, what would you advise him to do?" (Q17) The questions have five alternatives (1-to avoid army service, 2-enlist as a non-combatant, 3-let the IDF determine my placement, 4-serve as a combatant, 5-an elite combat unit), in which higher codes converted into positive response.

(7)   In your opinion, is it justified or unjustified to cut down social services to increase the defense budget? (1-definitely justified, and 4-definitely unjustified) The choices of justification were coded positive response.

(8)   Hoshino [2009] shows a concise explanation of the propensity score matching method for users without sacrificing the mathematical rigor.

(9)   See Krebs [2006], Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein [2004], and Yiftachel [2006].

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ABSTRACT

HAMANAKA Shingo

Military Service as a Process of Political Socialization: The Case of Universal Conscription in Israel

Despite Israel's adoption of universal conscription, one third of Israeli citizens avoid military service. We utilize the deviance from conscription to investigate the function of military service as a process of political socialization. This article provides an empirical examination of the effect of service in the Israeli Defense Forces on political attitudes. We test a hypothesis derived from the theory of national integration of the armed forces. That is, military experience raises consciousness of national security and produces an uncompromising defensive attitude toward the occupied territories. Data are from the Democracy Survey conducted in February 2007 among a representative sample of the Jewish population. The research design of our study applies propensity score analysis to produce as-if randomized treatment and a control group, almost the same as groups without military experience, and to control confounding variables. We demonstrate that conscripted Jewish citizens hold a similar distribution to non-drafted Jewish citizens in the categories of satisfaction with democracy, Zionist identity, opinions about leadership, and national pride. However, our analysis shows a counterintuitive result, that the experience of military service prompts opposition to Arab emigration and support for territorial concessions in the West Bank for the conflict resolution. The result is implicated in a reexamination of the theory of national integration of the military service.

Professor, Department of Law, Ryukoku University
龍谷大学法学部教授