

Foreign Affairs, the National Interest, and Secular-Religious Identities in Israel

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Abstract

Despite a key concept of International Relation theory, there is no consensus what the national interest is. It is almost impossible for political leaders of democratic states to make a crucial decision in foreign policies in considering only the national interest without public support. Rather, we are unable to imagine the national interest deprived of the public opinion. In general, international crisis galvanized the people held inconsistent opinions, unified political divisions of social cleavages like secular-religious identities into a nation for seeking the national interest.

The presenter proposes a method to operationalize the key concept and denotes a relationship between the national interest and religious identities in a democratic state. The selected case is the state of Israel. It is believed that Israel is a good sample to think about the association between foreign affairs and political attitudes since it is characterized as a socio-religious divided society and often waged war against Arab military forces.

Modern democracies contain a core to convert the will of the people into public policy in the form of legislation via national elections. Since diplomacy is a highly specialized policy field, it was thought in monarchies historically that, for foreign policy to make sense, it should rest in the hands of the sovereign rulers. The old common sense has developed into a new one, in which every policy is put under public scrutiny through the democratization without the exception of diplomacy. At first, specialists criticized the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. Nicolson (1963) warned that electorates are often irresponsible in foreign relations because of their ignorance, sluggishness, and obliviousness.

Thus, are ordinary citizens able to consider the national interest in order to evaluate foreign policies? First, we will investigate Hans Morgenthau's famous definition of national interest, the concept of interest defined in terms of power. It is not an easy task even for professionals, such as diplomats or political scientists, to examine how much power a state has. Since it is understood that the task is almost impossible for ordinary people, advocates of elitism have a good excuse to neglect the role of public opinion in the decision-making process of foreign policy (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1922).

The understanding, however, has transformed with political developments in modern democratic countries. As Waltz (1979) says: "Entailed in the national interest is the notion that diplomatic and military moves must at times be carefully planned lest the survival of the state be in jeopardy." His concept makes power calculation simple and means simply a careful concern for national security. In this definition, it is possible for ordinary citizens to assess foreign policies in consideration of the national interest.

Modern political elites in democracies need popular support to make critical decisions, such as waging war. Governments have to elaborate media strategies to galvanize public opinion to support war policy. A mature democratic system is, then, established on the assumption that the people can comprehend the national interest and evaluate diplomatic efforts in order to serve it.

The national interest, however, is a fluctuating and socialized concept rather than an obvious or rigid one. Finnemore (1996), an influential work of the constructivist paradigm in international relations, proposes national norms defining state interests. A constructivist hypothesis suggests the notion of national interest varies according to the content of a collective identity in a society (Hall 1999). If this were true, the structure of social cleavages between different identities would produce multiple national interests in a society.

The majority of empirical research on the link between foreign policy and public opinion has been conducted in the United States, and several studies have been carried

out in European countries. Because the population in these countries is large, a small proportion of ordinary people are directly affected by foreign affairs. If a small democratic country faces an international crisis, the conscript risk affects a greater portion of citizens than in larger countries. The citizens in the small country are more serious in considering the risk of foreign policy options under crises.

In this paper, we examine the effect of religious belief on attitudes toward foreign policy in the case of a small democratic country, with a strong collective identity: the state of Israel. On the one hand, the Israelis have a collective identity, Judaism, and have practiced democracy for more than sixty years. On the other hand, Israel suffers from a secular-religious cleavage within Judaism. The rift over collective identity often brings about severe political disputes on national integrity. The occupied territories is one of the most contentious issues over ideologies, national security, and religious devotion. As several studies recognize, it remains unclear how to explain theoretically the mechanisms through which religious beliefs influence foreign and security policy (Bader and Froese 2005; Glazier 2013; Guth et. al. 1996; Guth 2006; Warner and Walker 2011). This study tries to discover the missing link between religious identities and foreign policy.

In the following section, we review the literature and propose a hypothesis for the link between diplomacy and the religious identities of Jews in Israel. The second section explains data from an original survey in Israel, measuring evaluations of war and peace policies, and describes the secular-religious typology in the Israeli social context. The third section explains the research strategy for empirical analysis and shows the results in consideration of the hypothesis. Although our empirical approach is rarely applied in the literature of social science, we show that our method is superior to the traditional approaches to control confounding factors. The final section discusses the results and indicates some theoretical implications.

1. Theory

For a few centuries, no significant advances have been made in the normative theory about public opinion on foreign policy in democracies, with a few exceptions. Kant (1795) presents a comprehensive understanding of the topic, and we start the review of his argument from a departure (Fujiwara 2010; Iida and Sakaiya 2014).

The republican constitution does offer the prospect of the result wished for, namely perpetual peace; the ground of this is as follows. When the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether there shall be war or not and it cannot

be otherwise in this constitution, nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant to begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon themselves all the hardship of war such as themselves doing the fighting and paying the costs of the war from their own belongings, painfully making good the devastation it leaves behind.

Kant (1795/1996: 323).

Nowadays, this argument is the basis for research on democratic peace (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). Democratic peace studies developed the theoretical concept of domestic audience costs for the micro-foundation (Fearon 1994). The audience costs hypothesis is empirically supported by a few experimental survey studies (Toms 2007; Toms and Weeks 2013; Kohno 2013). These empirical studies also find evidence connecting foreign policy and public opinion, but are censured for the absence of external validity (Kurizaki and Whang 2014). That is, ordinary citizens are irresponsible in contemporary diplomacy, and even the relatively well-educated electorate lacks enough knowledge about national restrictions imposed by treaties to consider foreign affairs (Nicolson 1963; Almond 1950; Holsti 2004). The argument may be suitable for large countries, such as the United States, European countries, and Japan. However, it is not appropriate for a small democratic country such as Israel because of its sensitivity to damage and the burden of war. The case of Israel is better suited for Kant's theory.

The September 11, 2001, attacks led a certain number of social scientists to rediscover the faith factor in politics. "The crush of civilizations" became a highly influential paradigm for viewing global politics among generalists in the first decade of the 21st century (Huntington 1996). Social scientists preferred more academic literature, such as "religious nationalism" as an emerging ideology in conflict zones in place of secular nationalism (Juergensmeyer 1993) or "strong religion" to explain how to interpret religious extremists (Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003). Despite its growing importance, religion is a marginal topic in political science. Wald and Wilcox (2006), therefore, call for political scientists to focus on religious-secular conflicts. Needless to say, there has recently been significantly less consideration of the influence of religion in shaping public opinion on foreign affairs (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008: 171). Although Rebecca Glazer addresses the connection of religious beliefs to foreign policy issues in the application of a survey experiment, she admits that it remains unclear "exactly how religion might influence political attitudes" (Glazer 2013: 138-9).

Israel is established on Zionism as the foundation of the state, so we can regard every behavior, activity, and policy in line with Zionism as in the national interest. The founding

fathers of Israel sought to preserve the existence of Jews and selected the route of building a nation-state to escape the domination of the gentile. Zionists argue that their understanding of the world is similar to that of the realists in international relations (Harkabi 1988, chapter 5). Zionism, meanwhile, is connected to the fundamental concepts of Judaism and inseparable from the Promised Land, which is one of the important territorial concepts.¹ The connection leads to a problem regarding the dissimilarity between the land of Israel and the Promised Land. Indeed, successive Israeli governments have considered the concept of land for peace, a conflict resolution produced by strategic thinking in the territories. Consequently, land for peace is a possible option in international relations realist thinking, but it is incompatible with the principles of religious Zionism, which regards the Promised Land as containing all of the areas of the West Bank as an indivisible part of its territory.

The incompatibility resembles Miller's (2008) argument exploring the cause of regional conflict and peace. Miller demonstrates that the determinant of war-proneness is neither the pole structures of the international system nor the balance of power. It is important in his theory to look for the state-to-nation imbalance, which means a lack of congruence between the states and national identifications. Middle East war-proneness comes from the existence of nationalist and revisionist ideologies both in Arab countries and in Israel, such as pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, Greater Syria, revisionist Zionism, and the incoherent state system that seeks to redress the imbalance. We should investigate public opinions in Middle Eastern countries in order to test Miller's state-to-nation balance theory.

Arian (1995: 166–8), the most comprehensive analysis of survey datasets about Israeli attitudes toward national security, invokes religiosity, a major social cleavage, to examine the link between religious identification and political issues such as a return of the occupied territories. The religious-secular divide correlates statistically with Jewish attitudes toward the use of force in Barzilai and Inbar (1996). Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Peres (2000: 52) demonstrates that secularism is the most influential factor in determining people's attitude toward tolerance, the preference of democracy over nationalism, trust in public institutions, and position on the dovish-hawkish continuum in the Arab-Israel conflict. Herman and Yuchtman-Ya'ar (2002) underscores that religiosity consistently has the strongest influence on Israeli attitudes toward the Oslo process in regression analysis. The religious-secular divide is also statistically significant in explaining the variance of xenophobia, that is, attitudes of fear or hatred directed toward certain groups in Israel

¹ This is called religious Zionism. Further readings on the philosophy of Rabbi Abraham Hachohen Kook and the religious Zionist movement include Harkabi (1988), Sprinzak (1991), and Inbari (2012).

(Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005). The empirical findings of the democratic performance evaluation suggest that religiosity is strongly correlated with prejudice, political intolerance, and undemocratic norms (Ben-Num-Bloom, Zemach, and Arian 2011). The above review leads us to expect that:

Hypothesis: Secular-religious identities, or the religiosity of Judaism, will significantly predict attitudes toward future options and past achievements in Israeli foreign and security affairs as well as various territorial compromises from the viewpoint of the national interest.

2. Data and Measurement

To assess the impact of religiosity on evaluations of past and future security policies, we compare evaluations of secular and non-secular Jews in Israel. The data for this study come from the Israel Poll of the Middle Eastern Public Opinion Research Project. The survey data were collected during fall 2011 by the Dahaf research institute, which conducted phone interviews in Hebrew and Russian with a representative national sample of the 18 years and older Jewish population. A sample of 680 Jewish citizens was drawn using strata defined by demographic sector, or immigrants from the former Soviet Union, religiosity, characteristics of residential neighborhoods, and gender. One in five Israelis came from the former Soviet Union (21%) and more than half of the citizens identified themselves as secular (52%). The author and my collaborators prepared survey questionnaires to measure assessments of peace and war policies as well as the changing international environment.

2.1 Measuring Evaluations of Peace Policies

The category of peace policy in our dataset contains the Oslo Accord, the Peace Treaty with Jordan, the withdrawal from South Lebanon, and the demolition of settlements in the Gaza Strip. The Oslo Accords of September 1993 are a historical event in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They involved an impressive scene in which Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on the lawn of the White House. The Palestinians established autonomy in Ramallah the next year and from there, the sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority spread over a part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan in October 1994, making the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan the second Arab country formally at peace with Israel after Egypt.

In two decades, the government of Israel decided twice to withdraw from parts of the occupied territories. First, Prime Minister Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to withdraw from South Lebanon in spite of the presence of Hizbullah, a hostile armed force supported by Iran. Second, the Sharon administration faced severe resistance from settlers in making the decision to demolish the settlements in Northern Gaza, under the rule of Hamas, another hostile Islamist military force. The purposes of these withdrawals were the same, to avoid armed conflict with the enemies in the occupied territories. There was greater opposition to the withdrawal from Gaza than to that from South Lebanon because of the presence of the settlements.

2.2 Measuring Evaluations of War Policies

The state of Israel carried out three military campaigns in the first decade of the millennium. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided to conduct Operation Defensive Shield against Palestinian militants and even against his negotiating partner, Yasser Arafat. The government system of the Palestinian Authority reformed by creating the post of prime minister as a new negotiating partner for Israel.

The second Lebanon war was fought between the IDF and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. The Olmert administration failed to negotiate for the release of abducted soldiers and made a decision to wage the 34 Days War. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also conducted a war against Hamas during his reign, called Operation Cast Lead or the Gaza War in the winter of 2008–2009. The methods of the operation were mainly air strikes and a minimum of ground battles. The tactics therefore seem to have saved the lives of more soldiers in comparison with the Second Lebanon War.

2.3 Changing Regional Environment

Since 2000, the Middle East has changed, and it seems to have had some effect on Israeli foreign policy. The Bush administration launched the Iraq War in the spring of 2003. As a consequence, it got rid of the hostile Hussein regime and provided favorable conditions for Israel. It is unclear whether the Egyptian uprising, the January 25 revolution in 2011, produced a safer environment for the state of Israel, because of the confusing diplomatic stance of the Mursi administration, which kept the peace treaty with Israel despite its support for Hamas in Gaza. The Arab Spring spilt over other regions in the Middle East, but induced a severe and endless war between Bashar al-Asad and Syrian dissidents. Syria is now a failed state that armed radical Islamist forces have turned into a terrorist base. The situation is also unclear for Israel, as the Baathist regime was an enemy, but such disorder increases the risk of weapons proliferation and border incidents.

2.4 Future Crisis and Unresolved Issues

The state of Israel faces several unfolding issues; some of them carry risk, and others are a threat to national security in the future. The most sensitive issue is the construction of the settlements in the West Bank in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The government of Israel decided several times to freeze construction projects in the settlements in the past decades, but they have resumed with the failure of the peace talks or from the pressure of radicals in Israeli society.

Iran's nuclear program is the most serious concern not only about the Israeli national security, but also about the regional stability in the Middle East from the viewpoint of the Western countries. The Israeli political leadership has campaigned to alert the danger of Iran's ambition to develop a nuclear weapon and threaten to destroy the existence of the Jewish state. Though the current government of Iran takes part in the international nuclear talks, Israel does not hesitate about considering the strategic option of preemptive attack on the nuclear sites in Iran.

It is widely recognized that the largest obstacle to peace is the continuing occupations in the West Bank. The substance of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is concerned with to what extent are Israelis able to compromise on the territories. Since this is identical to a zero-sum game, such a structure makes the conflict intractable. Then, faith and nationalism increase in complexity of the territorial issue.

2.5 Religiosity

In the field of Israeli sociology, religious identification or religiosity in Judaism falls into four categories: Ultra-Orthodox, religious, traditional, and secular. Ultra-Orthodox Jews, or Haredim in Hebrew, are easily identified because of their clothing: A man wears a black frock coat and a black hat to represent his piety. They spend their life studying the Torah and strictly adhere to Halakhah, the collective body of Jewish religious laws. Religious Jews, or Datim, follow Orthodox Judaism and are considered the mainstream faction in the state of Israel. Orthodox rabbis, Jewish priests, control religious courts and religious administrations in Israeli society because of their adoption of Zionism. Both Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox have their own education systems with public support for the institutional reproduction of their communities. Religious Jews, especially the Ultra-Orthodox live together and have a community within themselves.

The traditional, or Masorti, is a recently created category for people who cannot identify with religious or secular Judaism. They respect Jewish tradition, culture, and rituals and follow religious practices more than secularists do. Many traditionalists are

more open to civil society, but feel pressure from the Haredi and Dati camps to abandon religion. Masortim also face pressure from secularists for not being modern (Sorek and Ceobanu 2009: 481). Despite these differences, we compile a “non-secular” category that includes Haredim, Datim, and Masortim for the purpose of convenience.

Secular citizens have different lifestyles from the non-secular. They are almost half the population in Israel and are establishments in politics, judicial circles, and the army. Israeli secular identity is widely regarded as non-observant of religious law or Halakhah and is associated with emptiness by non-secular Jews (Liebman and Yadgar 2009: 149). It is common for secular citizens to have various public viewpoints because of being in the majority but to have a tendency to view the religious with displeasure. Since Haredim, in particular, are exempt from serving in the military, ordinary Israelis feel that the exemption is unfair. The control of marital status by the Orthodox faction is inconvenient for some secularists who want a more liberal lifestyle (such as a marriage to a gentile partner or a same-sex marriage). Moreover, there is the possibility that different educational systems provide misinterpretations and religious prejudice against each other. The religious-secular dichotomy is a useful concept for analyzing contemporary Israeli society.

3. The Impact of Religiosity on the Attitudes toward Foreign Policies

Social scientists are often interested in finding causation in a society, but it is difficult for them to ascertain true causality even through statistical analysis. A main problem with statistical analysis is the difficulty of removing confounding factors. To solve this problem, we relied on regression models and derivational methods, such as binomial logistic regressions or multinomial probit models, with control variables. The solution of the regression, however, forces us to build a suitable model specification without omitted variables. This is not easy because a problematic specified model implies a bias in the estimate, which calculates an overvalued or underestimated coefficient of the independent variable.

3.1. Empirical Strategy

The estimation of the impact of religious identification has another constraint because of confounding factors among Jewish citizens. There are many differences between secular and non-secular Jews in education, occupation, size of family, and

monthly expenditure. The impact of religiosity on security policies may be affected by the interaction of demographic factors and control variables, so researchers must consider numerous combination patterns of the interactions in the regression models for effective estimates. In other words, attention must be given to addressing the curse of dimensionality.

One solution to control confounders is propensity score matching, proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This method has an advantage that reduces bias in estimations of religious impact as if it were a natural science. Propensity score means a predictive probability to a treatment group estimated from the existence of confounding factors.² Using the propensity score, we must data match to get the estimates of secularism as the treatment group on the attitudes to foreign policies described as average treatment effects (ATE). The employed matching algorithm is the Kernel matching method, proposed by Heckman et al. (1988), with bootstrapping to estimate standard errors of the ATE. The analysis was conducted using an add-on program for STATA developed by Becker and Ichino (2002).

Table 2 presents statistics of covariates to estimate the propensity score of secular Jews. The criterion for covariate selection comes from regression models in the literature. Arian (1995), Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008), Ben-Num-Bloom, Zemach, and Arian (2011), Sorek and Ceobanu (2009), Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Peres (2000), and Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur (2007) controlled ideology and demographics in the models for their estimations of religious effect. Table 2 shows that all covariates are significant for the estimated score of the treatment group without considering gender. The indicators of ideological values are the feeling thermometers of three political parties: Kadima, Likud, and the Labor party. Kadima was, at the time, a new party formed by former prime minister Ariel Sharon, who defected from the Likud party on the eve of the national election in 2006. Kadima occupied the majority of the Israeli parliament and represented the central position in the political context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the time the polls were conducted. Likud is a major political party on the nationalist right, and it has produced five prime ministers. Labor is another veteran party, regarded as the left for adopting social democratic policies and a conciliatory approach toward the Palestinians.

3.2. Results

Table 3 shows three statistics: the differences in the means between secular and non-secular groups from Table 1 (column 1); the coefficients on secularism in the ordered

² Hoshino (2009) shows a concise explanation of the propensity score matching method for users without sacrificing the mathematical rigor.

logit models (column 2); and estimations of average treatment effects (ATE) on the ordered categorical dependent variable (column 3), with a bias-corrected 95 percent confidence interval obtained by the Kernel matching method using the bootstrap option. The differences of the means are simple and rough indicators with no control of confounding factors. The ordered logit estimators are helpful as a typical traditional method to compare the significance of the estimations of the ATE on secular-religious identities.

Generally, the ordered logit estimators are more similar to the naïve differences of the means than the estimated values of the ATE. The logistic estimators on secularism are statistically significant predictors of attitudes toward the Oslo agreement, the IDF withdrawal from Gaza, the Gaza war in 2008–9, and a future military strike on Iranian reactors. However, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the ATE in the secular-religious divide contains zero, and the results are insignificant to predict the attitudes to these events. The different results between columns 2 and 3 in Table 3 mean that the traditional method, the ordered logit model, is not sufficient to correct for the bias induced by omitted interaction patterns of combinations of control variables.

The ATE of secularism passes the 5 percent significance level on evaluations of Operation Defensive Shield, enlargement of settlements, the independence of a Palestinian state, and compromise treatment with the occupied territories on the principle of land for peace. As can be seen in Table 3, secular Israelis assess Operation Defensive Shield—the largest military operation in the West Bank since the Six-Day War—at an average 0.358 points lower than religious Jews. The secular evaluation of settlement enlargement in the West Bank is calculated 0.727 points lower than the religious group's evaluation. Secularists give 0.463 points of additional support to a future independent Palestinian state compared with the religious. The land for peace settlement is given a 0.432-point positive assessment by secular citizens. The logistic models for these events also provide significant regressors, as noted in Table 3, but the effects of secular-religious identities in column 2 are overestimated compared with the values in column 3.

It is time we decide whether these findings support our hypothesis. The results in Table 3 show secular-religious identity significantly predicts attitudes toward some future options and toward some achievements in Israeli foreign and security affairs. The predictable issues are related only to the occupied territories in the West Bank. From the viewpoint of the national interest, non-secular Israeli citizens have a more negative attitude toward making compromises regarding the territories than secularists. However, the secular-religious cleavage provides no explanation for the difference of opinion on peace policies, political changes among neighboring countries, the future possibility of a

strike on Iranian nuclear reactors, or war policies, with the exception of Operation Defensive Shield.

4. Discussion

This study demonstrates the effect of religious belief on attitudes toward Israeli foreign policy. Previous studies underscore secular-religious identity as the strongest predictor of policy evaluation, including in foreign and security affairs. However, our results indicate the secular-religious divide is a significant factor only in public opinion on war operations or territorial compromises in the West Bank. The propensity score matching method reduces the bias in the impact of Jewish religiosity, which is overestimated in the literature. This finding contributes to a better understanding of the relationship of religion and foreign policy in small democracies.

It seems that for non-secular Israeli Jews, the occupied territories in the West Bank, called “Judea and Samaria” in the Biblical names, are integral and important parts of the Promised Land. Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories concerns not only homeland security in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv or poor housing conditions but also Zionist ideology, especially Religious Zionism. Therefore, “Judea and Samaria” are considered part of the territorial as well as national integrity of “Erez Yisrael,” the Land of Israel, among the non-secular. The unilateral withdrawals from South Lebanon and the Gaza Strip did not provoke a serious split in Israeli society. Despite conflict concerning the settlement evacuation, the land of Gaza is unproblematic from a religious perspective, which is supported by the estimations of ATE in the previous section.

In conclusion, we suggest a theoretical implication for foreign affairs and public opinion in democratic countries. When a disputed region is associated with the essence of a nation, the national interest is not defined in the strategic calculation of political leaders but is determined by a collective national identity. A forceful approach to the resolution of the territorial dispute will lead to a clash of social identities among the people and then serious reconsideration of the configuration of the nation-state. It is almost impossible because there is a high risk to national integrity in this reconsideration. Religion is an influential source of collective national identity; therefore, it often promotes intractable conflicts over territory.

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics								
	All Israelis		(a) Secular		(b) Non-Secular		Difference	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	(a) - (b)	All Obs
Peace Policy Indicators								
Oslo Agreement	2.79	1.32	3.09	1.22	2.48	1.35	0.61	634
Peace Treaty with Jordan	4.33	0.87	4.44	0.70	4.23	0.99	0.21	673
IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon	3.20	1.44	3.40	1.34	2.99	1.50	0.41	659
IDF Withdrawal from Gaza	2.60	1.42	2.85	1.33	2.31	1.44	0.54	663
War Policy Indicators								
Operation Defensive Shield in 2002	3.99	1.09	3.85	1.08	4.16	1.06	-0.31	658
Second Lebanon War	2.88	1.23	2.89	1.17	2.87	1.28	0.02	647
Gaza War	3.76	1.08	3.60	1.02	3.94	1.10	-0.34	655
Regional Environment								
Iraq War	3.31	1.18	3.21	1.06	3.40	1.30	-0.19	630
Egyptian Revolution	2.29	1.17	2.29	1.12	2.28	1.21	0.01	634
Syrian Unrest	3.02	1.31	2.85	1.24	3.21	1.36	-0.36	607
Future Crisis and Issues								
Enlargement of Settlements	2.90	1.43	2.38	1.30	3.43	1.36	-1.05	638
Military Strike at Iranian Reactor	3.22	1.47	2.94	1.41	3.47	1.48	-0.53	598
Independence of Palestinian State	2.89	1.41	3.33	1.25	2.39	1.41	0.94	648
Negotiations over the Occupied Territories (of 6)	3.49	1.47	3.90	1.40	3.07	1.42	0.83	651

TABLE 2. Estimation of the Propensity Score of Secular

Covariate	D.F	Wald	<i>p</i>
Feeling Thermometer			
Kadima (Center)	10	4.07	0.000
Likud (Right)	10	-5.62	0.000
Labor (Left)	10	2.49	0.013
Male	1	0.61	0.540
Former Soviet Union	1	7.53	0.000
Education	5	4.54	0.000
Expenditure	4	3.56	0.000

TABLE 3. Impact of Religiosity on Peace, War Policies, Changing Environments, and Future Crises

Dependent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Difference between Secular and Nonsecular (from Table 1)	Ordered Logit Estimation	Estimation of Difference by ATE	Bias-Corrected 95% Conf. Interval
Oslo Agreement	0.61	0.596 (0.183) ***	0.214 (0.150)	[-.046, .554]
Peace Treaty with Jordan	0.21	0.184 (0.191)	0.093 (0.095)	[-.030, .327]
IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon	0.41	0.248 (0.176)	-0.003 (0.138)	[-.248, .270]
IDF Withdrawal from Gaza	0.54	0.493 (0.181) **	0.034 (0.161)	[-.282, .410]
Operation Defensive Shield in 2002	-0.31	-0.626 (0.184) ***	-0.358 (0.091)	[-.526, -.198]
Second Lebanon War	0.02	0.084 (0.171)	0.019 (0.134)	[-.251, .296]
Gaza War	-0.34	-0.626 (0.180) ***	-0.225 (0.117)	[-.420, .107]
Iraq War	-0.19	-0.085 (0.181)	-0.051 (0.131)	[-.331, .160]
Egyptian Revolution	0.01	0.144 (0.182)	-0.224 (0.159)	[-.521, .064]
Syrian Unrest	-0.36	-0.239 (0.179)	-0.232 (0.162)	[-.645, .073]
Enlargement of Settlements	-1.05	-1.211 (0.186) ***	-0.727 (0.162)	[-1.07, -.445]
Military Strike at Iranian Reactor	-0.53	-0.421 (0.184) *	-0.338 (0.162)	[-.634, .038]
Independence of Palestinian State	0.94	0.828 (0.183) ***	0.463 (0.161)	[.028, .772]
Negotiations over the Occupied Territories	0.83	0.988 (0.183) ***	0.432 (0.175)	[.135, .747]

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

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