

# Sensitivity to casualties in the battlefield

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The State of Israel has had rare experience of fighting wars after the last millennium. The second Lebanon War and the Gaza War may count as major conflicts in the last decade for Israeli citizens. In this era, a democratic state—the United States being an exception—rarely engages in international conflicts without cases of international intervention. A representative democracy is assumed to be built upon the principle of public opinion underpinning public policy. Foreign and defense policies are generally not regarded as an exception to this principle. When we are interested in the role of public opinion in foreign and military affairs, it is comfortable for us to find a considerable amount of research based on data relating to the relationship between American public opinion and the US foreign policy (Everts and Isernia eds. 2001: 4). The researchers looking into the issue of public opinion shaping foreign policy, therefore, begin their academic investigation in the context of the United States.

This study examines how long the Israeli people support the government for an ongoing war. The rally-round-the-flag effect, or rally effect for short, proclaiming that wartime governments can enjoy majority public support at the beginning of wars, is a challenging topic in the field of International Relations (IR) (Colaesi 2007). Although this effect was noticed at the time of the Second Lebanon War (Elran 2007; Hamanaka 2011), it remains unclear which particular condition determined the duration of public support in Israel. While the rally effect is a universal phenomenon, it is important to keep in mind the particularity of Israel.

Most (but not all) analyses of Israeli public opinion in this regard point to a highly opinionated citizenry with a similar structure at the grass-roots level. The high level of political interest should not come as a surprise to those familiar with the context. Israel is a young society that has been engaged from its very inception in 1948 in a continuous struggle to ensure its existence in, and acceptance by, a politically hostile environment. Consequently, its ordinary citizens have developed a strong and ongoing interest in the conduct of the state's foreign policy, particularly as it affects relations with its Arab neighbors (Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 2002: 597-598).

I can show three reasons for addressing the case of Israel. The first reason to be considered is the wider perspective of the theory of public opinion in a war, based on the evidence of the US case (Baker and Oneal 2001; Burk 1999; Hayes and Guardino 2011; Schwarz 1994; Scott and Gary 2000; Verba et al. 1967). The theory should explain the level of public support in Israel if the rally phenomenon was universal. Second, Israel is not only the Zionist State, or the state for Jews, but also a state endorsing the democratic principle that public opinion underpins public policy. Defense is not the absolute agenda for the citizens but a political issue based on cost-benefit calculation, or as a cost minimization problem under the Israeli budgetary constraints. Third, the investigation on Israel would

lend further insights into the theory of the rally effect. Social psychologists provide the foundation of the rally effect on the concept of social identity (Coser 1956; Frieden, Lake, and Schultz 2013: 137). According to Shamir and Shikaki (2002: 541), the social identity theory shows, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, “group-mediated bias works to support group members’ needs to derive positive and distinct in-group identity and to maintain group status and integrity.” Maoz and McCauley (2009: 537) get empirical results of a survey indicating that Israeli Jews perceived zero-sum relations with and were in fear of the outgroup, the Palestinians, under intergroup threat—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

When our research derives a hypothesis from the theory on the duration of the rally effect, we have to pay attention to the fact that Israel fights to defend the country and has a purpose different from that of the United States. The social identity approach gives an intuitive understanding that the Israeli citizens might be less sensitive to the levels of casualties—a factor of decreasing approval rates for the government—than the American people because of the difference of purposes between self-defense and intervention in a foreign country. The expressions of a popular aphorism, for example, “the whole world is against us” or “nation that dwells alone,” might explain the Jewish feeling of being encircled by the enemies (Hermann 2001: 166). The education in history on the Zionist principle and the system of universal conscription count as the equipment to strongly compel the citizens to internalize Jewish identity (Sand 2010; Arian 2005; Furman 1999; Levy and Sasson-Levy 2008; Popper 1998). It would also underpin the intuition for keeping the duration of the rally effect in Israel. We, however, are uncertain as to whether the intuition is true before an examination of the data.

Yagil Levy, an Israeli political scientist, addresses the issue of casualty sensitivity in Israel. Levy (2011) mentions, “the legitimation of military sacrifice has declined since the 1980s, mainly following the First Lebanon War”<sup>1</sup> in 1982. The most recent government, Levy (2010) said, faced the tradeoff between casualty aversion—using excessive force and risk acceptance of casualties—and avoiding non-combatant fatalities; it then accepted the former strategy in Israel. The casualty aversion, shyness, tolerance or sensitivity, indicate common expressions about how casualties affect public support (Gelpi, Fever, and Reifler 2009: 8), and they generally play a key role in posing legal and moral constraints and, thereby, tying the hands of democratic governments in using military forces (Levy 2011: 387-388). Though we are interested in the arguments for a democratic face of Israel, there is no strong evidence in his research in this respect.

In the remainder of the paper, I first lay out the theories of the rally effect and the human cost thereof. Secondly, I delineate the rational expectation as the mainstream foundation for explaining public attitudes along with the bandwagon effect theory as the alternative approach. I emphasize the advantage of the bandwagon theory to explain the duration of the rally-round-the-flag mindset in Israel.

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<sup>1</sup> This corresponds to the interview story of an Israeli political scientist on November 22, 2015 in the Hebrew University.

Thirdly, I test my central hypothesis about poll information affecting the attitudes toward the government in wartime. I examine the importance of the bandwagon effect by analyzing the consistency of the data from our experimental survey. I conclude by discussing the external validity and implications of our findings.

## **Theory**

### **The rally effect and human cost**

Most scholars of international politics would point out Mueller (1973) for the seminal work on the study of public opinion concerning war (Baum and Groeling 2010; Berinsky 2009; Berinsky and Druckman 2007; Brody 1991; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005, 2009). The rally-round-the-flag effect denotes a phenomenon of increasing popular support their country's government involved into an international crisis or war, given the first systematic explanation by Mueller's study of public opinion on the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The rally effect fosters interest of political scientists including us who study democracy facing possible war. The main explanation for the rally effect put forward in the literature is that an international conflict causes an upsurge in patriotism and nationalistic emotion determining public support for using military force in a democracy. One of the impressive findings of Mueller is presidential approval rate decreasing in wartime proportionate to the increasing numbers of casualties. The phenomenon has been repeatedly observed in wartime and has been borne out not only in the United States but also in the United Kingdom, as well as the State of Israel (Ben Meir 2007; Lai and Reiter 2005; Evert and Isernia 2001).

The scholarly debate about the rally effect and casualties revolves around the question how increasing death toll of military operation influences the levels of support for the government waging a war. One view holds that the reflexive casualty-phobia makes the government lose the support under most circumstance by public reaction to the number of casualties (Mueller 1971, 1973). The finding of Mueller, like a logarithmic response, means small numbers of casualties generate large drop in Presidential approval just after the start in comparison with the casualties later in a conflict. The logarithmic response theme is criticized by a data fitting calculation of quadratic model in Brody (1991: 88-90) because three of the thirteen cases lost statistical significance. The study of public opinion on the Gulf War revise the finding to suggest that the citizens are sensitive not simply to absolute levels or the rate of casualties but to the human cost in the strategic context—success or failure (Mueller 1994: 124-129).

The theory of the reflexive casualty-phobia, based on the finding of Mueller, was challenged by an alternative view from several academic studies into the role of casualties in determining public support for military operations during the Cold War. The alternative view holds that a rational public respond to a leader's action in international events and perform a cost-benefit calculation of success and failure

in a military operation. We can easily identify the contrasting pattern of public support from the US casualties in each war and military operation (Larson 1996: 9). For example, the Franklin Roosevelt government had kept certain high support rates, about 80 percentages, during the World War II in spite of over 400,000 casualties. The Clinton government lost about 30 percentage points of public support in October 1993 by the death of ten soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu. Larson pointed out that public tolerance of casualties depended on making their own cost-benefit calculation about war because the rational assumption fit into the data of the surveys from the World War II to the Battle of Mogadishu. The alternative view, the rational expectations theory of casualties and wartime support, gains the acceptance of the academic majority now (Gartner 2008: 95; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009: 9; Sullivan 2008: 123). “The conceptualization of public support as a cost-benefit calculation, including judgments about the expected or actual success of the military intervention, has become **a common theme** in subsequent scholarship” (Eichenberg 2005: 148).

### **The theories on rational expectations in the public**

Christopher Gelpi and his collaborators conducted analyses of some aggregate and survey data and got some findings to support the rational expectation theory. One of their findings is that individuals structure their attitudes toward paying the human cost by means of their capability of cost-benefit calculation in facing difficult trade-off situations. The rational expectation theory<sup>2</sup> assumes that people employ their advanced cognitive faculties to assess the legitimacy of military operations; whether force is used in accordance with humanitarianism or with *realpolitik*—security oriented mission; whether any military policy objectives are based on the belief about a war’s likely success for the people, nor not. “Many factors ... affect the robustness of support. But the public’s expectation of whether the mission will be successful trumps other considerations” (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009: 2).

The rational expectation theory contains the assumption that the people oppose the government going for a war if the estimated utility<sup>3</sup> for loss exceeds the estimated values of the benefits (Gartner 2008; Larson 2000). This is similar to the assumption of microeconomics emphasizing on a better understanding of the micro-foundations of mass behavior. The scholars are interested in the trade-off between security and liberty in a democratic society. They have focused on the question of public casualty tolerance of the people, defined as the attitude about the rightness of the war under the cost

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<sup>2</sup> Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro present epoch-making studies of public support on the rational expectation theory. They deny the random and volatile behavior of collective public opinion concerning foreign policy derived from the instability mood theory in Almond (1950), but indicate the public opinion shows coherent patterns. See Page and Shapiro (1992) and Shapiro and Page (1998).

<sup>3</sup> Larson develops a simple formal model with three variables—the subjective estimate of operational success, the perceived benefits, and the anticipated costs—to provide a coherent explanation for dynamics of support for military operation (Larson 2000: 177).

constraint of casualties in the battlefield (Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gartner 2008; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005; 2009; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Larson 1996; Sullivan 2008). The question of tolerance for casualty has been approached rigorously by applying experimental survey methods to get a new finding or confirm the findings of previous studies (Gartner 2008; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009).

Some empirical studies on the cost-benefit model admit the bounded rationality of individuals. The elite cue theory suggests that individuals may rely on the information from their preferred messages of a political elite. This theory assumes the masses are not short of the capability to collect the required information to come to a judgment regarding international security. Instead, the public employs the political messages to reduce the cost of collecting information. The elite cue theory supposes that a prominent elite provides a reference point to the people to decide whether to support or oppose the government in wartime (Berinsky 2009: 69). The concept of cueing messages was defined as a “type of message carried in elite discourse...about the ideological or partisan implication” (Zaller 1992: 42). The elite cue theory emphasizes the importance of parsimony of effort to gather political information. The findings of Kull and Ramsay (2001) support this theory; the US citizens would be aware of seriousness of a military operation from the news of increasing casualties. Therefore, they do not respond reflexively to the fatalities. Adam Berinsky got the empirical results to reinforce relevance of the elite cue theory from his experimental survey data (the Iraq War Casualty Survey).

### **The bandwagon effect: An alternative theory**

We would question the assumption on which rests the theories of rational expectations of the public; the people employ their capability of cost-benefit calculation on the complicated foreign affairs, even though the theories permit the incomplete capability and the bounded rationality of the public. We hold on to an alternative theory emphasizing the role of affectivity of individuals on the flow of information in crisis. The bandwagon effect, a typical phenomenon depicting collective action, is defined as “a situation where the information about majority opinion itself causes some people to adopt the majority view for whatever reason” (Marsh 1985: 51). It is well-known that the bandwagon effect has often been found especially in voting. The classics of the election and communication studies observed the effect<sup>4</sup> (Campbell, Comverse, Miller, and Stokes 1960: 112; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968: 107-109) and many have tested the theory of the bandwagon on opinion formation. Rational voting theory may attribute the bandwagon effect to steps taken to avoid wasting a vote. However, one cannot expect studies of war and public opinion to be based on such rationality in the public because of paying no cost in showing his or her own opinion as a interviewee.

A number of affective theories underlie explanations for the bandwagon effects (Hardmeier 2008).

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<sup>4</sup> Mueller (1973: 206) is also the reference to the bandwagon effect. But he consistently treated with the effect only in the context of voting behavior.

Crowd psychology explains the bandwagon as an emotional contagion to join the majority. The uses and gratification approach describes an affective reaction to produce a good feeling in standing by the majority. Cue taking theory claims poll results provide a reference point to some people to decide whether to support or oppose the government in wartime; it has a similar mechanism with the elite cue theory. This theory assumes individuals to be reactive to the cues supplied by the polls as a substitute for messages from a prominent elite. The affective theories would be linked to patriotism as an emotion in times of war. The wartime press reports avoid criticism of the government and undertake a role of holding the nation together. The news promoting patriotism would enhance the bandwagon effect with the information of the polls.

Another theoretical approach, without the affective assumption, demonstrates that response to the results of polls may stimulate a process of self-persuasion. The cognitive response mode that Mutz (1997) constructed suggests the citizens may mentally rehearse their own opinions when they get information about the masses. The assumption of information processing in the model is not an affective but a highly structured cognitive mechanism among the people. From the approach of the cognitive response model, momentum—surges and declines of public support—is a result of cognitive information processing. This model, therefore, identifies the bandwagon effect on the momentum of mass cognitive response to cues from public opinion polls during wars.

The information of polls, according to the bandwagon theory, provides impetus for an individual's likelihood of supporting the government in war. This suggests the following hypothesis about how the trend in polls affects individual wartime support in spite of increasing number of casualties.

*Hypothesis:* The information of keeping support rates at a high level has the positive effect on individuals to support the government.

The bandwagon theory is based on the findings of the literature on American public opinion during wars. If we could underpin the bandwagon effect in the context of Israeli politics, the theory would have a broader range of application in democracies. I next show the experimental design to examine the argument.

### **Experimental design**

The hypothesis was tested by conducting an experimental survey. The population is adult residents aged 18 and above, male and female Jewish people, residing in the state of Israel; the sample size is 600. Data was collected by means of computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) and the survey was conducted from January 17 to February 4 of 2016. To improve the wording of the survey questionnaire prepared by the author, we cooperated with Dr. Rafi Ventura of the Guttman Center in

the Israel Democracy Institute, and Professor Camil Fuchs of Department of Statistics in Tel Aviv University. We considered possible confounding effect of various contexts, and thus prepared that the two situations were military operations against Hamas and military operations against Hizbullah and the three plausible scenarios to measure the effect of different information on public approval for the government. The respondents were randomly assigned to three groups for the scenarios in using the split sample technique. Two of three groups were the treatment group, which were given information on approval rates. The first group was people given to have information that *government support rate was still high* despite increasing casualties during the two weeks since the beginning of the war. The second was people given to have information that *government support rate fell sharply* because of increasing casualties. Another was the control group without any information on support rates.

[First situation]

Imagine the following situation. Israel is conducting operation against *Hamas in the Gaza Strip*. Suppose that at the beginning of the operation, there is great public support for both the administration and the operation itself, and assume that they support the action.

Now, let's assume two weeks from the beginning of the operation, there occurs, God forbid, many casualties....

[Second situation]

Now imagine the same scenario as before but this time it comes in the operation against *Hizbullah in Lebanon*. Again, let's assume at the beginning of the operation, there is great public support for both the administration and the operation itself, and assume that they support the action.

Now, let's assume two weeks from the beginning of the operation, there is, God forbid, many casualties....

Scenario 1: Suppose that despite the casualties, *government support rate is still high*.

[Treatment Group A: same public approval rate]

Scenario 2: Suppose that because of casualties, *government support rate falls sharply*.

[Treatment Group B: falling public approval rate]

Scenario 3: [Control Group: There is no information about support rates]

We prepared the two situations and the three scenarios, the 2×3 experimental design strategy, for the questionnaire to get three different groups for measuring the effect of poll information on public support. This design strategy allows us to identify the responses of which treatment groups would be similar to the responses to the control group. If Group A responses were similar to that of the control



group, i.e., we can recognize no difference between “same public approval rate” and “no information about support rates,” public support is expected to decrease when the Israeli citizens respond to sensitive information on death toll from the mass media. If Group B responses were similar to that of the control group, i.e., we can attract attention to “same public approval rate,” the government would be expected to enjoy the constant rally effect when the respondents decide to stand firmly for the war on despite getting information on increasing casualties. Here, we can validate the bandwagon effect in the Israeli context.

## **Analysis**

The levels of support for the government in three scenarios are shown when using force against Hamas in Table 1 and using force against Hizbullah in Table 2. We allocate support based on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being “Never support” and 4 being “Strongly support.” As Table 1 indicates, different information on public approval influence levels of support for the government. Israeli citizens appear to bear with increasing casualties when they know the government is strongly supported in an ongoing military operation. We expect any citizens to be intolerant of casualties with information on decreasing public approval sharply in the war against Hamas. Table 1 shows that the responses with no information on a poll may be different from those with information on sharply decreasing approval rates. The results of our experimental survey describe that the information on highly maintaining public approval rates support for the government in the ongoing operation in comparison to the scenario of decreasing approval rates or that of no information on a poll. The results in Table 2 are similar to those in Table 1, therefore, the operation against Hizbullah makes almost no difference of responses to that against Hamas. We found that the government enjoys 80 percent of the representative support in the scenario of keeping public approval, but the support rates drop to only 55 percent in the scenario of drastic decreasing approval because of increasing casualties despite waging war against any enemy organizations.

Next, in an effort to strictly examine the effect of information, we carried out a statistical analysis of these responses in the experimental survey using ordered logit. The results of ordered logit are shown in Table 3 under control of confounding factors because of our small sample for the experimental design. We begin by tying a pair of the groups to identify each of the scenarios. Six tied pairs are present on Table 3 because the experiment applied the 2×3 design; two situations and three scenarios using force against the enemies. Our main independent variable is *support rate information*, defined as a dummy variable, is coded 1 for the first treatment group, with information on keeping approval rates and 0 for any other group, if the tied pair of the scenarios is *still high-fall sharply* pair or *still high-no information* pair; displayed in column 1, 2, 4, 5 of Table 3. If the tied pair is only *fall sharply-no information* pair, the support rate information variable is also coded 1 for the second

treatment group, with information on falling public approval, and 0 for the control group, with no information on a poll, as displayed in column 3 and column 6 of Table 3.

For our control variables, in order to respond to potential confounding factors, we include demographic variables—gender, age, and higher education. The gender factor may influence approval in waging war, because most male citizens have been conscripted and subject to compulsory military service in Israel. There seems to be perception gaps between generations because of different experiences in the army, especially on whether to serve in a war. The Israeli higher education system is quite unique in religious consideration, having both secular universities as well as yeshivas, which are higher educational institutions for religious Jews. The distinction appears to account for approval or disapproval in an ongoing operation for the reason of right-wing leaning of religious people.

Moreover, for ascertaining party identification, we included a 10-point measure for the Likud and the Zionist Union; the party alliance established by the Israeli Labor party, Hatnuah, and Green Movement preparing for the 2015 legislative election. The variables of party identification represent respondents' ideology and are able to explain foreign policy positions. The Likud represents the largest rightist block and occupies a quarter of the current legislature, and is also the main party of the current coalition government. The Zionist Union is a representative center-left block in Israel and the largest opposition in the current legislature. We, therefore, expect that the position of the Likud produces tolerance for the human cost of war and preference for national security. The outlook of the Zionist Union is also expected to produce sensitivity to the cost of war.

It is important to note that information on keeping approval rates, *support rate information*, is a positive significant predictor of support for the government using force against the enemy organizations in spite of increasing casualties in the two weeks since the beginning of armed conflicts. The coefficient for *support rate information* is negative but not statistically significant in column 3 and 6; the tied case of *fall sharply-no information* pair. The results of the ordered logit agree with the apprehension of the levels of support in Table 1 and Table 2. Thus, after accounting for demographic and ideological factors, the experimental condition of keeping approval rates on a poll shapes the public tolerance for the human cost of war on terror in Israel. The treatment of information on sharply decreasing approval, however, has not any effect on varying levels of support compared to the responses in the control group; *no information*. The coefficients of some control variables—gender and Party Identification—are statistically significant and their signs indicate the expected directions.

Finally, we turn to Figure 1, which illustrates an intuitive understanding of how information shapes the public tolerance for casualties. The graphic in the top half of Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities derived from our ordered logit of column 1 in Table 2—the ongoing military operation against Hamas. We can recognize that there is a 20-percentage-point increase in probability of strongly support for the government waging war against Hamas from information on *fall sharply* to *still high* at the neutral position (=5) in party identification over the Likud. The graphic in the bottom half

displays the predictions derived from the model of column 4 in Table 2—the operation against Hizbullah. We also identify an 18-percentage-point increase in probability of strongly support in waging war against Hizbullah from *fall sharply* to *still high* at the neutral for the Likud party. Figure 1 presents that each of the rising curves—casualty tolerance—is dependent on varying party identification over the Likud. There are equal distances between the first, *still high*, and the second treatment group, *fall sharply*, among the Israeli citizens preferring the Likud; party identification ranging from 6 to 10, “strongly like.” The graphics illustrate narrower distances between the two treatment groups among Likud haters, ranging from 4 to 0, “strongly dislike.”

## Discussion

The duration of the rally effect is an exciting topic in the field of IR because the effect prompts a democratic government to continue a military operation. This study investigates the case of Israel to examine the experimental survey data and gets the results to support the hypothesis: The information of keeping support rates at a high level has the positive effect on individuals to support the government. The respondents show the continuous support significantly in both the tied pairs of *still high-fall sharply* and *still high-no information*. The result denotes that the bandwagon theory is considered reasonable to explain the duration of the rally effect in Israel. Additional findings suggest: (1) no difference between the scenario of *fall-sharply* and *no information*, and (2) no statistical difference of attitudes in the two situations—against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and against Hizbullah in Lebanon.

This research indicates that the bandwagon theory, even though it is based on the studies of American experiences, can explain the dynamics of the Israeli public opinion in wartime. The Israeli people are subjected to conscription as well as paying heavy taxes for the security of the state. They, therefore, seem to be regarded as individual citizens having independent thinking about and their own opinions on politics. “Two Jews, three opinions” is a well-known phrase that illustrates the diversity of opinions in the disputatious society. It is also noted that “individualism...can coexist with patriotism, loyalty, and commitment to the state” (Sheffer 1997: 138) in Israel after the Cold War era. However, the presence of the bandwagon effect suggests that emotional momentum—irrational responses to information of a majority support—would give the government opportunities to enforce a military operation despite increasing Israeli casualties.

The experimental survey sheds light on the mechanism that democratic states continue fighting wars on the strength of the rally duration effect. With no information of polls or on getting information of unpopular war, people experienced casualty aversion—became sensitive to death in the battlefield. In such a situation, *ceteris paribus*, the government would consider timing of a ceasefire. The findings of our survey show that ordinary citizens frequently stand with the trusted government continuing a war effort to control for explicit confounding variables, political ideologies, and demographic factors. They give approval not on the basis of rational calculation (Larson 1996) but as an affective reaction. The

result of polls often makes the people blind to the human cost—casualty sensitivity (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). This provides evidence in favor of the bounded rationality of the public in crisis situations.

Finally, we must admit that some questions remain unanswered in this study. Among these, the most important question is whether there are any possible explanations for the bandwagon effect. We cannot identify the crucial theory to explain the mechanism producing affective attitudes to the high levels of approval for the government. To clarify the crucial theory, we have to go through trial and error in further studies. Nonetheless, it is evident from our findings that we have to confirm again any theoretical foundation to support the concept of public support on a rational calculation. Moreover, researchers could study the rally effect on another democratic state. The implication is that further research would find clear-cut evidence to confirm the bandwagon effect on the duration of the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon in democracies of Europe or Asia.

**Table 1. The Effect of Poll Information in the war against Hamas**

|                  | Hamas                      |                              |                |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|
|                  | Support rate<br>still high | Support rate<br>fall sharply | No information |
| Strongly support | 83<br>45.9%                | 59<br>32.3%                  | 66<br>39.3%    |
| Support          | 61<br>33.5%                | 41<br>22.7%                  | 41<br>24.7%    |
| Not support      | 23<br>12.5%                | 39<br>21.7%                  | 29<br>17.2%    |
| Never support    | 15<br>8.1%                 | 42<br>23.3%                  | 31<br>18.8%    |
| Total            | 181                        | 181                          | 168            |



**Table 2. The Effect of Poll Information in the war against Hizbullah**

|                  | Hizbullah                  |                              |                |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|
|                  | Support rate<br>still high | Support rate<br>fall sharply | No information |
| Strongly support | 84<br>46.6%                | 55<br>31.6%                  | 62<br>37.8%    |
| Support          | 64<br>35.5%                | 42<br>24.0%                  | 47<br>28.5%    |
| Not support      | 22<br>11.9%                | 40<br>22.9%                  | 21<br>12.6%    |
| Never support    | 11<br>6.0%                 | 38<br>21.6%                  | 35<br>21.1%    |
| Total            | 180                        | 175                          | 165            |

**Table 3. The Effect of Poll Information on the Israeli Attitudes toward the Government in the 3x2 design**

|                                 | Hizbullah             |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                 | (1)High-Fall          | (2)High-No Info       | (3)Fall-No Info       | (4)High-Fall          | (5)High-No Info       | (6)Fall-No Info       |
| <i>support rate information</i> | 0.886 ***<br>(0.270)  | 0.714 **<br>(0.279)   | -0.279<br>(0.268)     | 0.847 ***<br>(0.277)  | 0.852 ***<br>(0.282)  | -0.112<br>(0.277)     |
| Male                            | 0.613 **<br>(0.307)   | 1.230 ***<br>(0.254)  | 0.924 ***<br>(0.312)  | 0.584 *<br>(0.313)    | 1.217 ***<br>(0.259)  | 0.768 **<br>(0.310)   |
| Age                             | 0.001<br>(0.008)      | -0.006<br>(0.008)     | 0.008<br>(0.009)      | 0.005<br>(0.009)      | 0.003<br>(0.009)      | 0.012<br>(0.009)      |
| Academic                        | 0.217<br>(0.321)      | -0.044<br>(0.280)     | 0.184<br>(0.289)      | -0.047<br>(0.332)     | 0.057<br>(0.292)      | 0.116<br>(0.296)      |
| Yeshiva                         | 0.365<br>(0.327)      | -0.499<br>(0.346)     | -0.487<br>(0.414)     | 0.204<br>(0.333)      | -0.488<br>(0.351)     | -0.551<br>(0.403)     |
| Party ID Likud                  | 0.248 ***<br>(0.046)  | 0.194 ***<br>(0.045)  | 0.280 ***<br>(0.051)  | 0.188 ***<br>(0.044)  | 0.142 ***<br>(0.044)  | 0.206 ***<br>(0.048)  |
| Party ID Zionist Union          | -0.168 ***<br>(0.047) | -0.161 ***<br>(0.044) | -0.198 ***<br>(0.048) | -0.160 ***<br>(0.047) | -0.169 ***<br>(0.044) | -0.154 ***<br>(0.045) |
| cut 1(K )                       | -0.486<br>(0.650)     | -1.418 **<br>(0.577)  | -0.356<br>(0.594)     | -0.926<br>(0.713)     | -1.230 **<br>(0.565)  | -0.343<br>(0.590)     |
| cut 2(K )                       | 0.694<br>(0.626)      | -0.269<br>(0.626)     | 0.792<br>(0.578)      | 0.312<br>(0.675)      | -0.220<br>(0.610)     | 0.691<br>(0.572)      |
| cut 3(K )                       | 2.108 ***<br>(0.660)  | 1.274 *<br>(0.661)    | 2.047 ***<br>(0.593)  | 1.805 *<br>(0.693)    | 1.442 **<br>(0.649)   | 1.967 ***<br>(0.594)  |
| Observations                    | 317                   | 328                   | 306                   | 310                   | 326                   | 300                   |

**Figure 1. The Estimations of Strongly Support to the Government**



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