

Palestinian Migration Under the Occupation: Influence of Israeli Democracy and Stratified Citizenship

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Abstract

Continuous conflict has affected the migration of the Palestinians. Following the first exodus in 1948, they continued to migrate out of compulsion or for practical reasons. This paper clarifies the contemporary situation and perceptions of migration among the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Given the influence of regulations, this study situates those areas as part of the Israeli democratic system. Based on an original poll survey conducted in the summer of 2011, the analysis attempts to explain the relationship between migration and citizenship. People's migration is analyzed in relation to their different statuses as citizens. The variants of the statuses are considered to be a result of the system of stratified citizenship, and it is characterized as a component of the democratic system of Israel.

Keywords

Palestine, Israel, stratified citizenship, migration, democracy

For displaced Palestinians, life as refugees has continued for more than 60 years following Nakba—the first catastrophe in 1948 deriving from the establishment of the state of Israel. Since then, Palestinians have lived in various places and countries and are now scattered all over the world. Their insufficient legal status as refugees or asylum seekers has greatly restricted their living, especially in regard to their ability to migrate, which is normally guaranteed as a right of citizenship.

Migration holds a complex meaning for Palestinians. Many experienced forced migration as a result of conflict in their homeland. Although some dream of returning, their requests for return migration are denied because of the political relationship with the Israeli government. For those who have remained in Palestine, *sumud*—steadfastness in their current place—has become considered to be a method of

resistance. However, the limited possibilities of the economic development under the occupation push them to migrate abroad.

Based on this understanding of Palestinian migration, this study clarifies the current situation of Palestinian migration. Focusing on residents of the territories occupied by Israel, the authors will investigate how their migration patterns are influenced by the Israeli political system regarded as “the only democratic state in the Middle East”. Given the complexity of regulations concerning citizenship in

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Israel and the Occupied Territories, the authors ask the following questions: How do Palestinians think about their migration? What was their historical experience? And what is their current desire for potential movement? How does their legal status as citizens influence their possibility of movement?

The analysis is based on a poll survey conducted in 2011 in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. In contrast to most previous studies, this study analyzes citizenship in these areas as a component of the state of Israel rather than as a separate political entity under the Palestinian Authority. The limited migration of residents is considered to be influenced by the Israeli distinctive policy and its stratified citizenship. With reference to the system of migration control maintained by the Israeli government, the authors examine the relationship between migration and citizenship under Israel's unique democratic system. This analysis contributes to the investigation of the condition of citizenship under autonomy. It also clarifies the power of the occupying authority over migration. At the same time, the current reality of stratified citizenship will be illustrated through the case of restricted freedom of movement.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN ISRAEL

In 1948, Israel declared its independence and became one of the newly borne Middle Eastern nation-states in the mid-twentieth century. Its political system claims to follow democratic norms, as it includes a multi-party system, probable change of governments, independent judiciary, and freedom of expression. However, "the support for abstract notions of democracy does not automatically extend to concrete policy issues" (Arian 2005: 439). In Israel, the disparity appears most salient for religious cleavage, and especially for Palestinians in Israel. According to an annual survey, 76% of Israelis opposed including Arab parties and ministers in the coalition government,

and in fact, only 51% of the general public of Israel responded in favor of "full equality of rights between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel" (IDI and Guttman Center 2010: 140-141).

This dilemma has its root in the ideology of the state itself. The basic law, which works as a *de facto* constitution, defines Israel as "a Jewish and democratic state". The Jewish character is emphasized according to the state's founding principle of Zionism, which claims Israel to be a state with a Jewish majority within its borders. At the same time, however, there are more than 1.5 million non-Jewish residents who comprise around 25% of the population (CBS 2010). In addition, the population of the Occupied Territories (which consist of the West Bank and Gaza Strip)¹ exceeds four million as of 2012 (PCBS 2012). This non-negligible number poses a serious challenge to the political system of Israel as a representative democracy.

There have been many debates on the compatibility between the Jewish and democratic nature of the state and some of these debates have mentioned the issue of citizenship (Peled and Shafir 1996; Smooha 1990, 1997; Yiftachel 2002; Rouhana and Sultany 2003). According to the official ideology, "Zionism and democracy are perfectly compatible and Israel is equally committed to both". Since Palestinians in Israel are "part of the Arab world that presumably threatens Israel's existence, restrictions of their rights could ostensibly be justified" (Smooha 1990: 393-394). Based on this assumption, Smooha advocated "ethnic democracy", which combined "the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutionalized dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups" (Smooha 1990: 391). It justifies the authority of one specific ethnic group—in effect, Jews—over other groups such as Arab Palestinians within the framework of democracy.

This inequality has led other scholars to describe the Israeli system as "ethnocracy" and point out the

range of structural impediments to the establishment of a stable democracy. Judaizing the character of the state is “at odds with the tenets of democratic citizenship, namely pervasive discrimination against Palestinian citizens” and “the ongoing military control and settlement of the Occupied Territories, whose Palestinian residents remain disenfranchised” (Yiftachel 2002: 39).

In this analysis, Yiftachel went further to present types of citizenship differentiated by the combination of legal and informal rights and capabilities. These groups include: (1) “mainstream” Jewish citizens; (2) ultra-Orthodox Jews; (3) “pseudo-Jews” (mainly Russian immigrants recognized as Jews under the Israeli law of return but not recognized as such by the religious establishment); (4) Druze; (5) Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship; (6) Bedouins; (7) East Jerusalem and Golan Arabs; (8) Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza; and (9) immigrant labor (Yiftachel 2002: 40). These categories adequately reflect the historical background and current legal positions of Israel’s various citizens, but it is remarkable to note that they include not only Israeli citizens but also Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. This classification reflects the reality that the state of Israel currently exerts administrative power over residents both inside and outside of the Green Line.

On the basis of the findings of the existing literature, the authors address the issue of citizenship for Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the authors analyze the influence of different citizenship status on their migration. The citizenship status of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories has distinctive characteristics. Although Palestinian residents of these territories are governed by the Palestinian Interim Authority, its autonomous power is limited, and the Israeli occupation affects every aspect of their lives. Migration is one area that is particularly affected. Aside from the checkpoints and separation walls, there

are complicated regulations that restrict free movement of the people from the Occupied Territories². For the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, identification (ID) cards and permissions for movement are critical to migration. Both are issued under the control of the Israeli government in coordination with the Palestinian authority. For residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, access to Jerusalem is severely restricted due to political tensions over the city’s sovereignty. These residents have to apply for permission for each visit to Jerusalem. Palestinians living in Jerusalem hold special IDs so that the Israeli government can differentiate them from other Palestinians who live in the Occupied Territories. Palestinians with a Jerusalem ID can visit inside of the Green Line without permission; however, they do not have full citizenship like the Palestinians with Israeli nationality. In addition, administrative coordination is still valid between Jordan and the West Bank, which authorizes Palestinians in the West Bank to apply for Jordanian passports based on the area’s historical background.

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

A poll survey was conducted in July 2011 as a part of the three-year project, “The Research in Integrated Approaches on Attitudes and Dynamics of Palestinian Migration”. It was launched in April 2011 within the framework of KAKENHI, Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A) No. 23681052 sponsored by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). The aim of this project is to clarify Palestinian attitudes toward migration and their trajectories of movement until present residence, utilizing integrated approaches of quantitative and qualitative research. For the purpose of understanding Palestinians as subjects of migration, the following points will be investigated: significant elements for the decision to move, motivation or condition for migration, and influence of legal restrictions.

The survey in Palestine was distributed to a representative sample of Palestinian residents (from 18 to over 65 years old) of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) administered the survey in coordination of the KAKENHI project and conducted interviews with a stratified three-stage random sample of 1,500 Palestinians. In the first stage, 163 sampling points (communities) were selected after stratification by district and type of community—urban, rural, or refugee camp—with probabilities proportional to size³. In the second stage, 10 households were selected from each of the chosen sampling points. Finally, in the third stage, one individual from each household was selected by using Kish's tables⁴. Face-to-face interviews were then conducted with the selected individuals.

The following section describes the distributions of migration experiences and desire for migration among the survey respondents. The statistical description of the discrepancy between Palestinians' experiences and desire for migration demonstrates how their possibility of movement is influenced by their conditions under the Israeli occupation. The authors use chi-square difference tests with cross tabulations to analyze the associations between two variables measured in nominal or ordinal scales. The Kruskal-Wallis test is also used when necessary. The style of this study is a quantitative monograph and suitable to describe complex reality and the effect of the patterns in Palestinians' holding of passports and ID cards on their freedom of migration.

MIGRATION EXPERIENCES AND DESIRE FOR MIGRATION AMONG PALESTINIANS UNDER THE OCCUPATION

Discrepancy Between Experience and Desire for Migration

As the first part of the analysis, the authors investigate migration experiences and desire for migration among

the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. For the definition of "migration", the authors subsume the experiences of moving or staying outside one's current community for over six months as well as deportation and resettlement within the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

One fifth of the survey respondents (21.5%) had experienced migration. Among them, as indicated in Table 1, over 40% moved within pre-1948 Palestine⁵. The other destinations varied from Jordan and Egypt to the Gulf States (among them, mostly Saudi Arabia). Only a small number of migrants moved to the United States or the European countries. While most studies of Palestinian migration describe them as refugees, forced migrants, or laborers, the results of this survey point to a different picture. Movement occurs more frequently within pre-1948 Palestine, and less movement occurs toward the outside. The reasons for this tendency may be assumed as follows: (1) exodus incurred within pre-1948 Palestine accounts for a certain number; (2) daily moves occur frequently inside pre-1948 Palestine for the purpose of work, study, or marriage; (3) movement is restricted toward the outside of the country; and (4) economic conditions restrict movement farther away. The former two reasons can be categorized as purpose-based⁶, while the latter are resource-based. Part of the applicability of these reasons is verified in the following analysis.

In the survey, about one fourth of the respondents (26%), slightly more than those who reported having experienced migration, indicated a desire to immigrate to foreign countries. By looking at the results presented in Table 1, two salient differences between the groups who have "experience" or "desire" in regard to migration can be easily recognized. First, in contrast to the high percentage of those who actually migrated to pre-1948 Palestine (44.7%), respondents indicated a low interest in moving there (17.4%). Second, several regions were the subject of high desire but much lower actual migration. The Gulf

Table 1. Destination of Palestinian Emigrants

Destination of emigration	Experience	Desire
The pre-1948 Palestine	144 (44.7%)	69 (17.4%)
Gulf States	58 (18.0%)	151 (38.1%)
Jordan	51 (15.8%)	40 (10.1%)
Egypt	30 (9.3%)	24 (6.1%)
United States	14 (4.3%)	63 (15.9%)
Other countries	25 (7.8%)	49 (12.4%)
Total	322	396

Note: Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

States are one such destination, reported by 38.1% as a desired destination but only by 18.0% as a place they had lived in. The United States is another such case, desired by 15.9% but realized by only 4.3%. These differences in numbers indicate the gap between reality and expectation in the situation of Palestinian migration. On the one hand, there is a strong desire to migrate to economically developed countries; however, on the other hand, movement is limited to within pre-1948 Palestine, a destination not necessarily considered attractive for the migrants' interests. This gap represents impediments to movement, which fortifies the hypothesis of the resource-based reason for migration.

Table 2 presents the replied reasons in the questionnaire for migration both experienced and desired. The respondents listed a wide variety of reasons for migration, from which multiple trends were identified. Among those who had experienced migration, the most popular reason for moving, cited by around 60%, was a connection to family, relatives, friends, or acquaintances living in the destination area. Second, about half of the respondents indicated their preference for cultural similarity with their homeland. Presumably, cultural similarities within Arab-Islamic societies would make migrants feel at ease because they would have fewer troubles with the local language or social customs such as religious practices and taboos. Compared to these reasons, the

motivations to earn higher income or pursue opportunities to develop one's professional abilities are less popular for those who have migrated. A history of living previously in the destination area was the fourth most popular reason. Ease of immigration and facilitation of further moves are not major reasons for migration.

In contrast, among those who desired to migrate, the most common reason cited was the wish to pursue higher income (77.7%) in the destination area. This marks a distinctive difference with the group who actually experienced migration, among whom only half reported the potential for higher income as a motivator. Having better chances to develop their professional skills was the second most preferred reason reported by those who desired to migrate (67.3%). These results are consistent with the findings of migration studies (Lewis 1954; Harris and Todaro 1970; Borjas 1989; Massey et al. 1998: 17-34), which suggest that migrants usually move looking for chances to earn a good wage or to learn a professional skill in foreign countries. Among people who desire migration, kinship networks, and familiar culture are secondary reasons (45.5% and 48.4%, respectively), in contrast to the high priority placed on them by those who have actually experienced migration.

A comparison between experience and desire, shown in Table 2, indicates a clear contrast between resource-based and purpose-based reasons. In the

Table 2. Reasons for Palestinian Emigration (Multiple Responses)

Reasons for emigration	Experience	Desire
Higher incomes	146 (48.8%)	297 (77.7%)
Skill development	121 (40.5%)	257 (67.3%)
Family, relatives, and friends	179 (59.9%)	174 (45.5%)
Cultural similarity	155 (51.8%)	185 (48.4%)
Easy immigration	106 (35.5%)	110 (28.8%)
Past living	137 (45.8%)	63 (16.5%)
Further migration	40 (13.4%)	89 (23.3%)
Total	299	382

Note: Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

“experience” group, resource-based reasons such as kinship relations or cultural familiarity—in other words, easy adaptation—were cited by a high percentage of respondents, while purpose-based reasons did not necessarily explain their frequent visits. In contrast, in the “desire” group, purpose-based reasons such as high income or skill development were dominant. This discrepancy between demand and experience may be well explained by restrictions in the respondents’ daily lives.

Reason for Migration According to Each Destination

In qualitative studies that deal with the specific category of migrants, principal destination countries are focused on, and migrants’ motivation or connection to the place is usually provided based on empirical evidence. In this study, the authors examined the linkages between the reasons and destinations of migration, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. The reasons for migration that were reported by over 50 percent of respondents are considered to be significant reasons for both actual and desired migration. Let us explore characteristics of the purposes of each destination.

In the “experience” group, hope for higher incomes and existence of kinship networks are

common reasons to move to the Gulf States and United States. The expectation of higher income is fairly understandable, while the influence of kinship networks suggests a certain pattern of migration. It is assumed that in both countries, people are provided job opportunities with the help of family, relatives, friends, or acquaintances already living there. On the other hand, migrants to pre-1948 Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt attach greater importance to kinship network and cultural similarity, regardless of the potential for higher income. In the cases of those who migrated to Jordan and Egypt, their record of past living played an important role as well. A comparison of the different reasons for migration showed kinship network accounts for over 50% of all the destinations; this result suggests a pattern of migrations that have occurred for resource-based reasons—specifically, the availability of kinship.

In the “desire” group, similar patterns are identified for the relation between reasons and destinations (see Table 4). However, the reasons tend to be more purpose-based. The hope for higher incomes and skill development constitutes especially high percentages of the reasons to move to the Gulf States and United States. Other countries and regions in Palestine are ranked high as well for the same reasons. Jordan and Egypt are preferred because of the kinship networks there. All the Arab countries are

Table 3. Emigrants by Destination and Reason (“Experience” Group)

Destination	Reasons							Total
	Higher incomes	Skill development	Family, relatives, and friends	Cultural similarity	Easy immigration	Past living	Further migration	
The pre-1948 Palestine	64 (46.4%)	59 (42.8%)	73 (52.9%)	78 (56.5%)	50 (36.2%)	62 (44.9%)	12 (8.7%)	138
Gulf States	39 (68.4%)	23 (40.4%)	38 (66.7%)	27 (47.4%)	17 (29.8%)	27 (47.4%)	9 (15.8%)	57
Jordan	24 (52.2%)	17 (37.0%)	31 (67.4%)	28 (60.9%)	20 (43.5%)	25 (54.3%)	6 (13.0%)	46
Egypt	5 (19.2%)	9 (34.6%)	18 (69.2%)	13 (50.0%)	9 (34.6%)	13 (50.0%)	1 (3.8%)	26
United States	8 (61.5%)	5 (38.5%)	8 (61.5%)	2 (15.4%)	4 (30.8%)	4 (30.8%)	6 (46.2%)	13
Other countries	6 (31.6%)	8 (42.1%)	11 (57.9%)	7 (36.8%)	6 (31.6%)	6 (31.6%)	6 (31.6%)	19
Total	146	121	179	155	106	137	40	299

Note: Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

Table 4. Emigrants by Destination and Reason (“Desire” Group)

Destination	Reasons							Total
	Higher incomes	Skill development	Family, relatives, and friends	Cultural similarity	Easy immigration	Past living	Further migration	
Palestine	48 (71.6%)	46 (68.7%)	32 (47.8%)	49 (73.1%)	20 (29.9%)	23 (34.4%)	14 (20.9%)	67
Gulf States	132 (89.8%)	100 (68.0%)	63 (42.9%)	79 (53.7%)	44 (29.9%)	15 (10.2%)	30 (32.3%)	147
Jordan	19 (47.5%)	19 (47.5%)	33 (82.5%)	30 (75.0%)	23 (57.5%)	12 (30.0%)	8 (20.0%)	40
Egypt	7 (36.8%)	11 (57.9%)	10 (52.6%)	14 (73.7%)	4 (21.1%)	6 (31.6%)	3 (15.8%)	19
United States	56 (90.3%)	46 (74.2%)	19 (30.6%)	5 (8.1%)	10 (16.1%)	4 (6.5%)	20 (32.3%)	62
Other countries	35 (74.5%)	35 (74.5%)	17 (36.2%)	8 (17.0%)	9 (19.1%)	3 (6.4%)	14 (29.8%)	47
Total	297	257	174	185	110	63	89	382

Note: Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

favored as destinations because of their similarities with Palestinian culture. Among them, Jordan is the only country favored due to the ease of immigration. It is easy to understand in light of the special cooperation between Israel and Jordan, such as the open-bridge policy for the Jordan River and issue of Jordanian passports to residents of the West Bank. One's record of past living has only a weak influence, and the hope for further migration does not attract many potential migrants, with the exception of the United States.

The analysis of migration experiences and desire among Palestinians under the occupation shows a clear discrepancy between their hope and reality. They migrate more frequently within pre-1948 Palestine

than toward the outside, although they report a preference for the latter. During actual migration, Palestinians tend to choose places where they have a kinship network or cultural similarity, yet they report a preference for places where they can earn higher wages or develop their professional skills. This contrast can be summarized as follows: Actual movement occurs mainly for resource-based reasons, while the desire to move is often motivated by purpose-based reasons. These trends are confirmed through analysis of the linkage between reasons and destinations. While migrations to the Gulf States and United States were preferred by a high percentage of respondents for the purpose of earning higher incomes or developing professional skills, in actuality, the

number of migrants to those countries is limited. As shown by the cases of Jordan and other Arab countries, ease of immigration or existence of a kinship network helps facilitate movement to a great extent. The presence of relatives in the destination area also helps migration to non-Arab countries such as the United States.

The people's usage of kinship networks and easier immigration procedures indicates their value to Palestinian migration. This finding coincides with Hanafi's (2007) analysis, which called one's network of family and friends as "social capital" (p. 52). Yet, it may also suggest that there are no other resources available to Palestinian migrants. If people have full citizenship of any country, their ability to migrate is guaranteed, at least for a short period, by mutual recognition and procedures of the governments. This principle does not apply to most Palestinians. They do not have their own nation-state recognized internationally, though it has declared its independence and is run by the Palestinian Authority⁷. For residents of the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem, their rights as citizens are regulated and restricted through the coordination with the Israeli administration. The effect of their limited citizenship is clearly indicated through their legal status and restricted access to migration. ID cards and passports represent these limitations and show an aspect of the stratification of citizenship in Israel.

How is the movement of Palestinians regulated? What categories are used for the citizenship in Israeli democracy? To what extent does such classification affect migration? Is there any authority the Palestinian Authority can assert toward migration? What is the relationship between Israeli citizenship and Palestinian Authority? The following section examines these questions through the analysis of the relationship between migration and legal status. It will be an investigation focusing especially on citizenship as another aspect which gives easily neglected but unavoidable effect on their migration.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONE'S LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND MIGRATION

Issue and Effect of ID Cards

Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem have different kinds of IDs and passports to be used for their migration. The Palestinian Authority issues Palestinian IDs and passports to the residents of the Occupied Territories; however, other kinds of documents are available as well according to a person's life trajectory.

As shown in Table 5, an overwhelming majority of the survey respondents (92.4%) hold Palestinian IDs. These ID cards are issued to Palestinians over 16 years old by the Palestinian Authority in coordination with the Israeli government⁸. The presence of the Israeli administration is obvious from the Hebrew description alongside Arabic letters. The issue of the Palestinian IDs functions as a control system for their movement and it can be verified through the following barrier system. There are Israeli military checkpoints and temporary roadblocks set up between the Palestinian residential area and pre-1948 Palestine, and in most cases, Palestinian ID holders are not allowed to cross these points. They are identified by the IDs as ineligible for crossing unless they acquire a special permit for each occasion. When one applies for a permit, his/her criminal record is checked by the ID number, and people who are recorded as having engaged in political activities against Israel have almost no chance to obtain them⁹. In this sense, IDs are not documents facilitating migration but rather parts of the control system of movement. On the Palestinian side, the same ID works also for administrative use, such as in elections of Palestinian Authority or applications for Palestinian passports.

Another type of ID is the Jerusalem ID, which is held by Palestinian Arabs who have certain roots in Jerusalem. According to Table 5, their number is relatively small (6.7% of the respondents). This ID makes the process of migration much easier than the

Table 5. ID Type Held by Palestinians

ID type	Frequency	Percent
Palestinian	1,386	92.4
Palestinian & Jordanian	(40)	(2.9)
Palestinian & United States (Green Card)	(2)	(.1)
Palestinian & Saudi Arabia or Egypt	(2)	(.1)
Jerusalemite	100	6.7
Jerusalemite & Jordanian	(5)	(5.0)
Jerusalemite & United States (Green Card)	(5)	(5.0)
Jerusalemite & Kuwait	(1)	(1.0)
Israeli	9	.6
No ID	5	.3
Total	1,500	100

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are contained in the above category. Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

Palestinian ID, as it indicates the holder to be a quasi-citizen of Israel. This special ID is issued because Israel declares Jerusalem as its capital, and it is necessary to give some legal status to the people who were already living. Jerusalem ID holders can travel inside of Israel—pre-1948 Palestine—including Jerusalem without a special permit. However, this ID differs from the Israeli ID, which is held by Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who have Israeli nationality. The latter means full citizenship of Israel, including franchise for national elections. Residents of East Jerusalem have either Jerusalemite or Israeli ID cards. Among the survey respondents, very few minorities, comprising only .6%, hold the latter type of ID. The status of being a Jerusalemite or Israeli citizen guarantees a person to pass easily through security checkpoints with fewer problems. Such legal status is envied as privilege by other Palestinians.

Some of the survey respondents hold several ID cards. Table 5 shows that 40 Palestinians have both a Palestinian and Jordanian ID card. This is the highest number of dual card holders; however, still it represents only around 3% of the Palestinian ID holders. The other second IDs are from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Kuwait—the countries

previously mentioned as destinations of migration. The experience of long residence and the intent for further migration may have facilitated the respondents' obtaining of such IDs.

Issue and Effect of Passports

While ID cards influence mobility of the Palestinians within pre-1948 Palestine borders, passports facilitate mobility between countries. This survey investigated the holding rates of each passport through a question that permitted multiple answers. As shown in Table 6, half of the respondents reported having Palestinian passports. About 16% of all respondents hold Jordanian passports and some of them also hold Palestinian passports. According to Table 6, a small group of people have either Egyptian passports, Egyptian travel documents, or passports issued by the United States or Israel.

As in the case of IDs, accessibility in migration depends on the country of issue of one's passport. In general, the Palestinian passport is the easiest to obtain, but it is the least useful for the purpose of migration; when they travel with Palestinian passports, they have to go through complex procedures in advance to obtain visas for each country of

Table 6. Passport Type Held by Palestinians

Passport type	Frequency	Holding rate
Palestinian	755	50.3
Jordanian	237	15.8
Egyptian	16	1.1
Egyptian travel document	16	1.1
United States	14	.9
Israeli	7	.5
Other countries	9	.6

Note: Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

destination. This derives from the fact that Palestine is not legally admitted as an independent state in international society. Passports issued by the Palestinian Authority are considered to be travel documents and not all countries acknowledge them as valid as passports. Compared to this, Jordanian passports work more effectively for migration because they facilitate mobility of the holders as Jordanian citizens.

Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are eligible to obtain Jordanian passports based on the historical background of the areas. Since the war of 1948 until 1988, Jordan annexed the West Bank politically, legally, and administratively and considered it to be a part of Jordan. Palestinians who had been in or fled to the West Bank and Jordan after the war of 1948 were offered Jordanian nationality. Since the declaration of disengagement in 1988, the status of residents of the West Bank went through several changes (Susser 1990: 25-30; Nishikida 2008: 92-95); however, the issue of passports has not ceased. This history illustrates Jordan's special interest in the West Bank, a relationship that has benefitted West Bank residents in regard to their ability to migrate.

According to this survey, Jordanian passport holders are outnumbered when compared with Jordanian ID holders. Tables 5 and 6 show 237 respondents hold Jordanian passports, while only 45 hold Jordanian IDs. This clearly suggests the utility of

Jordanian passports, as passports are more useful than IDs for international migration. The findings of Table 7 confirm the linkage between the country of issue of the passports and frequency of migration. According to the table, around 43% of Jordanian passport holders immigrated more than once compared to around 21% of Palestinian passport holders. For the Jordanian passport holders, this includes those who experienced migration once (27.0%), twice (12.2%), and thrice (4.2%), and similarly, for the Palestinian passport holders, it includes those who migrated once (15.4%), twice (2.9%), and thrice (2.8%). The authors constructed a chi-square difference test that indicates statistical significance in the distributions between the Palestinian and Jordanian passport holders. Another statistical analysis is performed using the Kruskal-Wallis test to reject the null hypothesis that there is no linkage between groups ($p < .0001$). The results indicate that a Jordanian passport is effective in facilitating voluntary Palestinian migration abroad or return migration.

To judge the influence of age on migration, Table 8 presents a triple cross tabulation showing the distribution of migration experience by passport type and age group. The left side of the table shows that the proportion of migration experience for Jordanian passport holders is 20% higher than that of Palestinian passport holders in the group aged 40 and under. The difference between Jordanian and Palestinian passport

Table 7. Number of Emigration Destination Countries by Passport Type

	Numbers of emigration destination countries over six months				Total
	No emigrate	Once	Twice	Thrice	
Palestinian passport	511 (78.9%)	100 (15.4%)	19 (2.9%)	18 (2.8%)	648
Jordanian passport	134 (56.5%)	64 (27.0%)	29 (12.2%)	10 (4.2%)	237
Total	645	164	48	28	885

Notes: $\chi^2 = 53.237$, $df = 3$, $p < .001$. Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

Table 8. Distribution of Migration Experience by Passport Type and Age

	Until 40 years old			Over 41 years old		
	No emigrate	Migrated	Total	No emigrate	Migrated	Total
Palestinian passport	326 (81.5%)	74 (18.5%)	400	182 (74.9%)	61 (25.1%)	243
Jordanian passport	73 (61.3%)	46 (38.7%)	119	61 (51.7%)	57 (48.3%)	237
Total	399	120	519	243	118	361

Notes: $\chi^2 = 20.961$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$ (the left side). $\chi^2 = 19.434$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$ (the right side). Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

Table 9. Number of Emigration Destination Countries by District

	Numbers of emigration destination countries over six months				Total
	No emigrate	Once	Twice	Thrice	
The West Bank	610 (77.7%)	128 (16.3%)	36 (4.6%)	11 (1.4%)	785
The Gaza Strip	461 (80.9%)	79 (13.9%)	13 (2.3%)	17 (3.0%)	570
East Jerusalem	107 (73.8%)	29 (20.0%)	7 (4.8%)	2 (1.4%)	145
Total	1,178	236	56	30	1,500

Notes: $\chi^2 = 13.648$, $df = 6$, $p < .05$. Source: Poll Survey of Palestinians in the Middle East, 2011 (KAKENHI No. 23681052).

holders increases slightly more in the group aged 41 and over, as shown in the right side of Table 8 (23%). The chi-square tests reject the independence of two variables, the passport type and migration experience, at the 1% significance level in both sides of the table. Therefore, Table 8 indicates that the effect of passport type on migration is significant regardless of age, while the number of those who have experienced migration increases with age.

Based on the administrative resources available, including ID cards and passports, is there any pattern of migration by district of residence? In other words, to what extent does the difference in citizenship status affect migration? Part of the answer is indicated in Table 9. According to the survey, the frequency of migration differs among districts of residence; while more than 26% of the respondents who were residents

of East Jerusalem experienced migration more than once, the rate dropped to 23% for residents of the West Bank and less than 20% for those living in the Gaza Strip. The chi-square test rejected the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level. In summary, the proportion of those who have experienced migration increases in the order of residents of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza Strip.

There may be several reasons for this difference, including various lifestyles or social relationships with connections outside of Palestine. However, it can most likely be explained by the different residency status. Different rules are applied to restrict movement according to the districts of residence. Needless to say, residents of the Gaza Strip suffer from the strictest regulations; they are allowed to go abroad only through Egypt with severe observation on their ways.

People from the West Bank are subject to similar regulations, but they can take Jordanian passports to obtain visas with fewer troubles. Palestinians who live in Jerusalem are in a much better situation than the former, as they have Jerusalem IDs, which facilitate easier movement to the Israeli border.

These different migration statuses can be considered to be an effect of the stratification of citizenship in Israel. Citizenship implies not only freedom of movement, however it still consists a crucial part of the rights as citizens. Legal or administrative restrictions based on one's region of residence indicate that certain residents are situated differently from others at the level of citizenship. Some groups of people are differentiated among the population in the context of Zionism in this case—to discern Jews from Palestinians. As is shown by the case of the Jerusalemites, the difference is not dichotomous but in gradation; it is described as “stratified citizenship”.

Stratified citizenship can be observed in many countries where there are ethnic minorities. In the case of Israel, from a strategic viewpoint, this is crucial because of the nation's particular type of democracy, as mentioned in Section 1. For the sake of being “a Jewish and democratic state”, the government must keep a Jewish majority in the population and at the same time pursue democracy. Legal exclusion or discrimination is not a preferable choice, and this is the reason why stratified citizenship works effectively. While Israel does not consider residents of the Occupied Territories as its citizens, it still has responsibility for their citizenship, as they are effectively put under its control. Differences in citizenship status affect people's mobility and create different situations of migration according to the residential district.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, the authors made inferences of

experience and perception about migration among Palestinians under the occupation. The destinations and reasons of migration were quantitatively described from the poll survey analysis. According to the inferences, they have mainly two reasons for migration: resource-based and purpose-based. Among the former, legal status as citizens was put special interest and its influence was analyzed in more detail.

The Palestinian Authority regulates legal status of its citizens in coordination with the Israeli government. Legal documents for identification are issued and used for control of the movement of the people in the East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. People are issued different ID cards and passports according to their places of residence, and those documents restrict the freedom of mobility. In other words, the extent of free movement depends on their status as citizens, and the differences in citizenship determine the extent to which basic human rights and dignity are admitted for Palestinians. It demonstrates the inherent existence of stratified citizenship, which reflects Israeli policy; the stratified citizenship works as a tool of control in order to sustain Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state”.

Nevertheless, Palestinians employ available resources and migrate for practical reasons. They prefer to move to economically developed countries such as the Gulf States and United States, seeking higher income or opportunities for professional skill development. However, their hope differs from reality to a large extent; their real experience of migration tends to be limited to within pre-1948 Palestine. They try to use as many resources as available to them, including kinship relations. Kinship relations help migration in both a legal and social sense, as indicated by the case of migration to the United States. Special diplomatic arrangements derived from a historical background also help migrants to obtain travel documents, as seen in the case of the Jordanian passport. Legal or social resources support economic resources and help migrants choose their destination.

In sum, the analysis of the survey results revealed the difficulty of migration for Palestinians under the occupation. It was indicated by their low migration rate. However, at the same time, it can be noted that they are active migrants in some respects. While their possibility of movement is limited under the occupation, they continue to move seeking preferable conditions and economic or professional opportunities. In that sense, migration seems to be considered as a strategy to improve their living situation. The limitation on the movement is an invisible issue and appears only on occasion of passport control or identification check. However, the issue is deeply rooted and associated with the matter of citizenship. Palestinians under the occupation have different legal status according to their residence and are required to navigate complex regulations on movement for each citizenship. That is the effect of the stratified citizenship which has the power to control migration of the people. The complex system of citizenship, in addition to the severe identification check can be observed in different contested areas including Palestine/Israel. The complexity can be justified from the necessity of national security, but may degrade the contents of democracy in the sense of equality. The case of Israel represents a pattern of them which is based on its specific national ideology.

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Notes

1. The definition of the Occupied Territories in this article does not include East Jerusalem. This is not based on the political stance of the authors but on the different legal status of the residents there, and for the benefit of analysis.
2. Latest condition of the check points and separation walls is updated on the map by OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). See "Map Centre", OCHA.

Retrieved May 16, 2012 (<http://www.ochaopt.org/generalmaps.aspx?id=96>).

3. The statistical foundation of the procedure of probabilities proportional to size is explained in Chapter 7 of *Survey Sampling* (Kish 1965).
4. Kish took us through the use of Kish's tables in the selection of individual respondents (Kish 1965: 395-404).
5. This category contains the Occupied Territories, East Jerusalem, West Jerusalem, and the land occupied by Israel during the 1948 war.
6. Takaoka and Hamanaka (2011) presented empirical findings on Palestinian migrations driven by the purposes of work, study, or kinship network.
7. The independence of the Palestinian State was declared at the Palestinian National Council in 1988 unilaterally in the aftermath of the first intifada (uprising), and interim autonomy by the Palestinian Authority was agreed in the Oslo agreement (*The Declaration of Principles*) in 1993. The first election of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Palestinian President was executed in 1996.
8. The explanation of procedures related to Palestinian migration is detailed in *Palestinian Diaspora in Jordan: Their Watan and National Identity* (Nishikida 2010).
9. It is based on the authors' field research in 2004 in the West Bank.

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